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Does It Pay to Work?
by Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Alexi Sluchynsky
Does it pay to work?  This is a tough question to answer because
of the complexity of the tax code and a plethora of dynamic
linkages involved.  First, earning more today typically alters
current saving and, therefore, future capital income taxes.
Second, earning more today generally alters future consumption
and, therefore, future consumption taxes.  Third, changing future
levels of income and assets changes the eligibility for and levels
received of income- and asset-tested transfer benefits.  Fourth,
the most important transfer program, Social Security, explicitly
links future transfer payments to current earnings.  Fifth, income
taxes in retirement depend on past earnings because Social
Security benefits depend on past earnings and these benefits are
subject to federal income taxation. This paper attempts to capture
the net effective tax on work by using an intertemporal model
capable of carefully determining tax and transfer payments at each
stage of the life cycle.
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dynamic optimizationI.  Introduction
Does it pay to work? Given the number and complexity of
federal and state tax and transfer systems, this is a tough
question to answer.  The problem is greatly compounded  by the fact
that what one earns in one year alters not just current taxes and
transfer payments in that year, but in future years as well. 
There are five dynamic linkages here.  First, earning more in the
present typically alters current saving and, therefore,  future
levels of capital income and capital income taxes.  Second,
changing future levels of income and assets changes the
eligibility  for and levels received of income- and asset-tested
transfer benefits.  Third, earning more in the present generally
alters not just current, but also future levels of consumption,
and,  therefore, future consumption taxes.  Fourth, the most
important transfer program, Social Security, explicitly links
future transfer payments to current earnings.  Fifth, the income
taxation of Social Security benefits means that income taxes in a
year Social Security benefits are received depend on past Social
Security-covered  earnings because the benefits are, themselves,
determined by past covered earnings. 
Thus,  understanding  the  effective  net tax on work and the
changes in work taxes associated with policy reforms requires an
intertemporal  model capable of carefully determining tax and
transfer payments at each stage of the life cycle based, in part,
on economic choices in prior periods.  This study uses ESPlanner,
a  financial planning software program developed by Economic
Security Planning, Inc., to study the net work tax levied on
workers with different earnings capacities.
 ESPlanner  smooths households’ living standards subject to2
their  capacities to borrow.  In so doing, it makes highly
detailed, year-by-year federal and state income tax and Social
Security benefit calculations.  To produce a comprehensive work
tax measure, we added to ESPlanner  all other major transfer
programs, including Food Stamps, Transitional Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (TAFDC), Medicaid, Medicare, Housing
Assistance, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Special
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children
(WIC), and the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP).
Our goal is calculating average and marginal net work taxes
facing stylized young couples with different levels of earnings. 
 We begin by calculating average lifetime net tax rates defined as
the ratio of lifetime net taxes to lifetime earnings.  We then
present average and marginal net tax rates on working full-time
and  half-time throughout one’s lifetime and the marginal net tax
from  switching  from  half-time to full-time work.  Finally, we
measure marginal net tax rates on working at particular ages. 
Our measured present values of spending in both the presence
and absence of fiscal policy are actuarial calculations.  They
adjust for the probability that one or both spouses may die prior
to  reaching her or his maximum age of life.  This actuarial
valuation is very important because surviving widows and widowers
can face very different taxes and transfers from those they face
when married.  These survivor-specific  fiscal policies are  also
included in the analysis.
We  find seven things.   First, our fiscal system is highly
progressive.  Households earning the minimum wage receive 18 cents3
in benefits net of taxes for every dollar they earn.  In contrast,
households  with million dollar salaries pay 54 cents in taxes net
of benefits per dollar earned.  Second, progressivity is primarily
restricted to the bottom end of the income distribution.  Average
net work tax rates of middle class households are relatively high
compared with those of the rich.  Third, while the poor face
negative average taxes, they face significant positive marginal
net taxes on working.  Indeed, a minimum wage household that
chooses to work is forced to surrender 34 cents of every dollar
earned in net taxes.  For workers earning one-and-a-half or more
times the minimum wage, the marginal net tax on full-time work
exceeds 50 percent.   Fourth, low-wage workers face confiscatory
tax rates on switching from part-time to full-time work.  Fifth,
the same is true of secondary earning spouses in low-wage
households.  Sixth, the marginal net tax on working is
dramatically  higher  for most workers when young than when old. 
Seventh, average and marginal net work tax rates are relatively
insensitive to the assumed rate of real wage growth and the
discount rate.  And eighth, major tax reforms, such as switching
from income to consumption taxation, can have a significant affect
on the fiscal system’s overall progressivity.
The paper proceeds with a brief mention of related prior
studies.  It next describes the complexity of the tax-transfer
system and, by implication, the need to sweat those details to
measure net tax rates accurately.  It then describes our
methodology,  ESPlanner  and its use in this study, the
characteristics of our stylized households, our approach to
modeling the fiscal system, and our findings.   The final section4
summarizes and concludes.
II.  Prior Studies
Many studies of lifetime fiscal burdens and their
distribution  have examined one fiscal policy at a time.  Boskin,
et. al. (1987), Caldwell, et. al. (1999), Gokhale and Kotlikoff
(1999), and Myers and Schobel (1993) are all examples of studies
of  Social Security’s lifetime net tax treatment.  Poterba (1989)
considers the lifetime incidence and distribution of excise taxes.
 And  Fullerton  and Rogers (1995) study the lifetime incidence of
consumption taxes.  None of these studies consider the tax on work
per se.
Fullerton  and Rogers (1993) represents the first serious
attempt to quantify the lifetime burden of the entire U.S. tax
system, but, again, not the tax on work.  They construct an
elaborate life-cycle general equilibrium model and use it to study
the  incidence of particular U.S. tax systems.  Their impressive
framework allows them to consider the full incidence of the tax
system.  Fullerton’s and Roger’s approach and subsequent related
work by Altig et al. (2001) provide significant insight into the
burden and distribution of gross tax  liabilities.  Fullerton and
Rogers find that the personal federal income tax is highly
progressive,  with  the lowest income groups paying 5 percent of
their lifetime incomes and the highest income groups paying 19
percent.  
Although these studies tell us a lot about gross tax
liabilities,  they  are  relatively silent about overall net tax
liabilities as well as the net tax on work.  Moreover, they are
highly stylized and do not consider many of the details of the5
tax-transfer  system that affect its  impact.    For example, they
don’t consider tax credits, such as the earned income tax credit
and the child tax credit.  Nor do they consider the phase-out of
itemized deductions, the taxation of social security benefits, or
the progressivity of state income taxation. 
Hubbard et al. (1995) provide a partial equilibrium analysis
of  the impact of the fiscal system on saving decisions in a
setting with earnings and health expenditure uncertainty.  Their
focus is on the system’s transfer programs, particularly its
saving  disincentives  for the poor.  Although their model would
permit an analysis of the fiscal system’s overall progressivity,
they don’t use it for that purpose.  Nor is it necessarily ideal
for such an analysis because it is also highly stylized. 
Unlike the studies of Fullerton and Rogers (1993) and Altig
et al. (2001), the analysis here is partial equilibrium in nature;
i.e., it doesn’t take into account feedback effects of fiscal
policy on the pretax level of wages or the pretax return to
capital.  And unlike Hubbard et al. (1995), our model doesn’t
consider behavioral reactions to fiscal work and saving
disincentives.  Instead, we investigate the work disincentives of
our  tax-transfer  program without studying the reaction of
households or the macro economy to those disincentives.  In this
respect, our study is close to Pechman’s (1985) work, although his
focus was comparing annual gross taxes to annual income, as
opposed to comparing lifetime net taxes to lifetime income. 
III. The Complexity of Our Tax-Transfer System
It’s  difficult to exaggerate the complexity of the taxes and
transfer programs facing American workers.  Mastering just the6
federal income tax represents a major challenge because it
comprises so many special provisions.  The list includes the
inflation-indexation of tax  brackets,  the partial, but graduated
taxation of Social Security benefits above two non inflation-
indexed thresholds, the treatment of retirement account
contributions  and  withdrawals,  the  phase-out of itemized
deductions,  the earned income tax credit, the child-tax credit,
the alternative minimum tax, and the recently legislated credit to
low-income households for contributing to retirement accounts.  
If  the federal income tax weren’t hard enough to follow,
almost all states have income taxes with their own special
provisions.  For example, Massachusetts  has a special exemption
for the elderly, a child deduction, a rental deduction, and a
deduction  for  employee-paid  payroll taxes.  Compared to these
taxes, the FICA payroll tax may seem straightforward.   But workers
who want to calculate their lifetime net work taxes must
understand its ceiling, how that ceiling changes through time, the
degrees to which employer and employee payroll contributions are
and are not subject to federal and state income taxation, and the
degree to which their employer’s retirement account contributions
and other fringe benefit payments are and are not subject to
payroll taxation. 
Figuring out these three tax systems and their
interdependencies  provides a good  apprenticeship  for  approaching
our benefit programs.  The most complex of these is surely Social
Security, which requires a handbook of over 500 pages to clarify
its provisions.  Those brave enough to wade through this tomb will
learn about eligibility requirements, primary insurance amounts,7
partial wage indexation of earnings histories, inflation
indexation of benefit levels, benefit reductions for early
retirement, recomputation of benefits, the delayed retirement
credit, family benefit maximums, the recently modified earnings
test,  retirement benefits, survivor benefits, mother and father
benefits, children benefits, spousal benefits, and divorcee
benefits.  Unfortunately, reading the Handbook in its entirety
raises almost as many questions as it answers – questions that can
only be resolved via detailed interrogatories  with  actuaries at
the Social Security Administration.
Although their intricacies pale in comparison with those of
Social Security, understanding the details of our other benefit
programs can also gray one’s hair, particularly those dealing with
the  relationship of one  program’s benefits to those of another. 
Take Medicare and Medicaid.  Medicare’s co-payments are covered by
Medicaid under certain conditions.  But if covered, these co-
payments reduce the income deduction for Food Stamps and, thus,
the ultimate amount of Food Stamps received.  And Medicaid
benefits are, themselves, income tested, where income includes
Social Security and SSI (Supplemental Security Income) benefits.
IV. Defining Net Work Tax Rates
A simple two-period framework motivates the formula we use to
calculate  net tax rates on working.  Let cy  stand for consumption
when young, co for consumption  when old, r for the pre-tax rate of
return earned on saving, ey  for earnings from working full time
when young, e0 earnings from working full time when old, and T(ey,
eo, cy, co, r)  for the present value, discounted at  rate r, of
lifetime net tax payments.  We write lifetime net tax payments as8
a function of earnings when young and old, consumption when young
and old, and the pre-tax rate of return, since taxes paid and
transfer payments received when young and old depend on all of
these variables.
1  
The household’s lifetime budget constraint is
(1) ) , , , , ( r e e c c T E C o y o y − = ,
where  C stands for the present value of consumption and E  for the
present value of earnings when the household works fulltime and
earns  ey when young and eo  when  old.
2    The average work tax rate,
−
τ , is defined as.
(3)   E
r e e c c T o y o y ) , , , , (
= τ .
To understand our calculation of marginal net work tax rates,
let C* refer to the present value of consumption  when earnings are
zero (when the household doesn’t work), and let c
*
y  and  c
*
o  denote
consumption when young and old in that setting.  Hence,
(2) ) , 0 , 0 , , (
* * * r c c T C o y − =
Note that C*  can be positive when earnings are zero if the
household receives transfers (T* is negative).   The marginal net
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To understand this tax rate, note that E+C* represent  the increase
                        
1  For example, consumption taxes, including sales taxes and excise taxes,
depend on consumption when young and old (cy and co); payroll taxes when young
and old depend on earnings when young and old (ey and eo); and income taxes
depend on total labor plus asset income when young and old (ey and eo + r(ey –
cy)).
2 That is, C = cy +co/(1+r) and E = ey+eo/(1+r).9
in  lifetime spending that would occur if, in going to work, the
household could keep it’s basic benefits, measured by C*  (the
present value of consumption if the household doesn’t work), and
also keep its entire increase in lifetime earnings, given by E
(the present value of full-time earnings).  The difference  between
this amount and C -- what the household actually gets to consume
as  a  result of working – is the numerator of this tax rate.  It
represents the absolute amount the household loses (or gains, if τ
is  negative)  from working.   This net loss divided by the total
potential gain is the net tax rate from the household working full
time over its lifetime.
Note that E not only equal the present value of earnings; it
also equals the present value of consumption that the household
would enjoy in the absence of any fiscal policy (the case that
T(ey, eo, cy, co,  r)=0    regardless of its arguments).  Call that
present value C**.    Hence, the work tax rates can be expressed
solely in terms of present values of consumption; i.e.,
(4)  * *
) , , , , (
C
r e e c c T o y o y = τ ,  and
(5)        * * *
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These formulae are, with several important caveats, the ones
we  use to measure average and marginal net tax rates from full-
time work as well as from half-time work.  The first caveat is
that we replace the present values of consumption with their
corresponding present values of total spending.  Spending includes
not just expenditures on consumption goods and services,  including
housing services, but also spending on life insurance premiums and10
special  expenditures,  like weddings and college tuition paid on
behalf of children.  Second, since some of spending goes to pay
excise, sales, and other taxes on consumption, in measuring the
present value of spending in the presence of fiscal policy, we
reduce spending by θ  percent, where θ  is the consumption  tax rate.
 In what follows, “spending” is used to refer to spending net of
consumption taxes. 
A  third important difference in our actual and the model’s
net tax rates is that our measure of the present value of spending
adds in the present value of all transfer payments other than
Social Security benefits (which are already included in
ESPlanner).    Effectively,  then we treat all non-Social Security
transfers (Food Stamps, WIC, TAFDC, Housing Assistance, SSI, WIC,
and LIHEAP, Medicare, and Medicaid) as non-fungible  and simply add
their present value to the present value of spending calculated by
ESPlanner.    Our  procedure  here assumes that these benefits are
spent in the year they are received.  This makes sense for most of
these  transfers,  since they are provided in kind, rather than in
cash.  However, our treatment of TAFDC and SSI, which are provided
in  cash, as non-fungible is made for  computational convenience. 
Specifically,  treating these two benefits as fungible dramatically
increases computation time because of the complexity of their
income and asset tests.
V.  Actuarial Valuation
There is a final and very important difference in our actual
net work tax formula.  In forming the present values of lifetime
spending (and consumption, which we need in order to net out
consumption taxes), we take into account the fact that neither11
spouse may live to her or his maximum age of life (age 95).   As a
widow or widower, each spouse will pay different amounts of taxes
and receive different amounts of benefits than would be the case
was she still married.  Our precise net work tax formulas are
based on the actuarial present values of lifetime spending, where
we a)  multiply the spending levels in all future years when both
spouses are alive by the probability of their both living through
those years and b) multiply the spending levels when each spouse
is  a  widow or widower by the probability of that survivorship
state  occurring.  Since the amount a widow or widower spends in a
particular  year can differ depending on when her or his spouse
passed away, we form survivorship probabilities conditional on the
age of death of the spouse and calculate spending separately for
each spouse conditional on the death age of her/his partner.
VI.  ESPlanner
ESPlanner  uses dynamic programming techniques to smooth a
household’s  living standard over its life cycle to the extent
possible without allowing the household to go into debt.  In
making its calculations,  ESPlanner  takes into account the non-
fungible nature of housing, bequest plans, economies of shared
living, the presence of children under age 19, and the desire of
households to make “off-the-top” expenditures on college tuition,
weddings,  and other special expenses.  In addition, ESPlanner
simultaneously calculates the amounts of life insurance needed at
each age by each spouse to guarantee that potential survivors
suffer no decline in their living standards compared with what
would otherwise be the case.12
ESPlanner’s calculates time-paths of consumption expenditure,
taxable saving, and term life insurance holdings in constant
(2001) dollars.  Consumption in this context is everything the
household  gets to spend after paying for its “off-the-top”
expenditures – its housing expenses, special expenditures,  life
insurance premiums, special bequests, taxes, and net contributions
to  tax-favored accounts.  Given the household’s demographic
information, preferences, and  borrowing  constraints,  ESPlanner
calculates  the highest sustainable and smoothest possible living
standard over time, leaving the household with zero terminal
assets apart from the equity in homes that the user has chosen to
not sell.  The amount of recommended consumption expenditures
needed to achieve a given living standard varies from year to year
in  response to changes in the household’s composition.  It also
rises when the household moves from a situation of being liquidity
constrained to one of being unconstrained.  Finally, recommended
household consumption will change over time if users intentionally
specify that they want their living standard to change. 
ESPlanner’s  algorithm is complicated.  But it’s easy to check
ESPlanner’s  reports to see that, given the inputs, preferences,
and borrowing constraints, the program is recommending  the highest
and  smoothest possible living standard that the household can
sustain over time. 
Since the taxes paid by households depend on their total
incomes, which include asset income, how much a household pays in
taxes each year depends on how much it has consumed and saved in
the past.  But how much the household can consume and, therefore,
how much it will save depends, in part, on how much it has to pay13
in taxes.  Thus taxes depend on income and assets, which depend on
taxes.  This simultaneity means that the  time-paths  over the
household’s  life cycle of consumption, saving, and tax payments
must be jointly determined.  ESPlanner  achieves this simultaneous
and  consistent solution not only with respect to consumption and
saving decisions, but also with respect to the purchase of life
insurance.
3
Because taxes and Social Security benefits make a critical
difference to how much a household should consume, save, and
insure, casual calculations of these variables is a prescription
for seriously misleading financial recommendations.
4  As mentioned,
ESPlanner  has highly detailed federal income tax, state income
tax, Social Security’s payroll tax, and Social Security benefit
calculators.  The federal and state income-tax calculators
determine whether the household should itemize its deductions,
computes deductions and exemptions, deducts from taxable income
contributions to tax-deferred retirement accounts, includes in
taxable income withdrawals from such accounts as well as the
taxable component of Social Security benefits, and calculates
total tax liabilities after all applicable refundable and non
refundable tax credits. 
These calculations are made separately for each year that the
couple is alive as well as for each year a survivor may be alive.
                        
3 The program not only calculates the appropriate levels of life insurance at
each age for each spouse when both are alive.  Bit also determines how much
life insurance each surviving spouse needs to purchase.
4    See Gokhale, Jagadeesh, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, and Mark Warshawsky,
“Comparing the Economic and Conventional Approaches to Financial Planning,” in
Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Essays on Saving, Bequests, Altruism, and Life-Cycle
Planning, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, NBER volume, 2001, 489-
560.14
 Moreover,  ESPlanner’s  survivor tax and benefit calculations for
surviving wives (husbands) are made separately  for each possible
date of death of the husband (wife).  I.e., ESPlanner  considers
separately  each date the husband (wife) might die and calculates
the taxes and benefits a surviving wife (husband) would receive
each year thereafter.
VII.  Our Stylized Couples
Our stylized household features a husband and wife, both of
whom are initially age 18 and live at most to age 95.  The couple
has two children, one at age 25 and one at age 27.  Both spouses
earn the same income and work through age 64.  Their initial
annual earnings, which grow by 1 percent in real terms each year,
are multiples of the minimum wage times 40 hours per week times 52
weeks.  Both children attend college between ages 19 and 22. 
Couples with annual earnings below $105,000 pay one third of their
total initial real annual earnings in college tuition/room and
board for each child for each year of education.  For couples
earning $105,000 or more, college support payments are capped at
$35,000 (one third of $105,000). 
The couple initially rents a house for 25 percent of its
total initial annual earnings.  But at age 25, the couple
purchases a house for three times initial earnings.  This purchase
is  financed with a 20 percent down payment and an 80 percent
mortgage carried at an 8 percent nominal interest.  The couple
earns a 4 percent real pre-tax return on assets.  Funeral expenses
for each spouse are 10 percent of each spouse’s initial annual
earnings, up to a maximum of $10,000.  There are no bequests apart
from the value of home equity when the last spouse dies, since the15
couple never sells its home.
VIII. Modeling the Fiscal System
As  indicated in the Appendix, our analysis incorporates all
major  tax-transfer programs at both the federal and state levels.
 To account for overall labor productivity  growth, which we assume
underlies  the growth in real wages of our stylized couples, we
index annual real benefit amounts as well as real benefit brackets
in the benefit formulae to an index of the real wage.  We assume
this index grows at the same rate as the real wages of our
stylized couples.  The one exception here is the thresholds at
which Social Security benefits become taxable under the federal
income tax.  The federal government has eliminated  inflation-
indexation of these thresholds in what appears to be an
intentional policy of increasing, over time, the share of benefits
subject to taxation.
From an economics perspective, employer-paid payroll taxes
are no less of a burden on workers than those paid directly by
employees.  To incorporate these taxes, we gross up each spouse’s
labor earnings by the amount of the employer-paid  payroll  taxes
and raise ESPlanner’s  rate of payroll taxation from 7.15 percent
to  15.3 percent – the combined OASDHI payroll tax rate.
5  For
purposes of calculating federal income taxes, however, we do not
gross up labor earnings, since employer contributions are an
exclusion  from the federal income tax base.  While making these
adjustments  makes no change in ESPlanner’s recommended  consumption
or  total spending in the presence of the tax-transfer  system,
                        
5  To be more precise, we gross up each spouse’s labor income by a) 1.45
percent, which is the HI employer payroll tax rate, plus b) 5.7 percent of
labor earnings up to the OASDI taxable earnings ceiling, where 5.7 percent is16
these values are higher when we turn off all taxes and transfers.
 In terms of equation (4), C**  (the present value of spending in
the absence of all taxes and transfers), and, therefore, our
calculated lifetime net work tax rate, is larger because of this
adjustment for employer-paid payroll taxes.
Like employer-paid payroll taxes, federal and state corporate
income taxes represent a hidden tax, whose burden (incidence)
falls on workers.  We treat these taxes in a parallel fashion to
employer-paid  payroll taxes.  Specifically, we a) increase our
assumed nominal rate of return by the amount of these taxes and b)
adjust  ESPlanner’s  calculation of income taxes to include these
“corporate”  taxes on capital income.  By making these two
adjustments,  ESPlanner’s  recommended consumption and, therefore,
present value of spending in the presence of the tax-transfer
system remains unchanged, but it is higher when we turn off all
taxes and transfers.  Again, C**,  and,  therefore,  our  calculated
lifetime net work tax rate, is larger because of this adjustment
for  employer-paid  payroll taxes.  In making this adjustment for
corporate income taxes, we are assuming that the elimination of
corporate income taxes would fully redound to the benefit of
workers in the form of a higher rate of return earned on their
savings.
6
The Appendix details our calculation of taxes and the
benefits from transfer programs.  In the case of the various
benefit programs, we take into account income and asset tests.  We
                                                                              
the OASDI employer payroll tax rate. 
6An alternative incidence assumption, which would be appropriate for a small
open economy and which we don’t pursue here, is to assume that the incidence
of corporate income taxes falls on workers in the form of lower wages, rather
than lower after-tax rates of return.17
also take into account the joint determination of benefits arising
from the fact that the level of benefits available from one
program may depend on the level of benefits received from another.
IX.  Findings
Table 1 presents average net work tax rates from full-time
work.  This tax rate divides the household’s total net taxes
associated  with working full time through retirement by the
present value of spending the household would enjoy in the absence
of  taxes or transfers.  Consider first households earning the
minimum wage.  Their average net tax rate is a negative 17.8
percent meaning their lifetime spending is 17.8 percent higher
from working than it would be in the absence of any fiscal policy.
 The  table’s second row indicates  that  households earning 1.5
times the minimum wage, or $32,100 at the beginning of their
careers, face a 25.8 percent average net work tax.  For household
earning twice the minimum wage, with an initial annual income of
$42,800, the average net tax rate is 33.4 percent.  For households
earning from three to forty times the minimum wage, average work
tax rates gradually rise from 40.2 percent to 54.4 percent.
These findings lead to the following three conclusions. 
First,  subsidization of work essentially begins and ends with
minimum wage households.  Second, most low-income households pay
fairly  substantial  shares of their lifetime economic resources in
the form of net taxes.  And third, the fiscal system is fairly
progressive at the bottom, but is roughly proportional  with
respect to the treatment of upper middle-income, high-income, and
very high-income households.18
Tables 2 and 3 clarify the source of these findings.  Table 2
shows the present values of the various taxes and transfers for
different multiples of the minimum wage.  Table 3 scales Table 2’s
values by the present value of spending in the absence of taxes
and  transfers.  The tables contain seven features worth
mentioning.  First, the present value of federal income taxes rise
from a negative 2.6 percent of spending to a positive 4.0 percent
as we move from a 1 minimum wage to a 1.5 minimum wage household.
 Hence,  notwithstanding  the earned income tax credit, the child
tax credit, and other progressive features of the federal income
tax code, federal income taxes are positive, on net, for
households  with very low, if not the lowest, levels of income. 
Second, personal federal and Massachusetts’  state income taxes are
highly  progressive,  while payroll taxes are highly regressive. 
Third,  consumption  taxes are somewhat regressive.  Fourth,
corporate income taxes, while progressive, are  relatively
insignificant.  Fifth, Medicaid and the other welfare benefits are
targeted exclusively to the poor.  Sixth, the other transfer
programs -- Social Security and Medicare – provide their benefits
on a highly progressive basis.  And seventh, one cannot assess the
overall degree of the fiscal system’s progressivity by considering
any one tax or transfer program in isolation. 
Marginal Net Full-Time Work Tax Rates
Table 4 switches attention from average to marginal net full-
time work tax rates.  As discussed above, the marginal net full-
time work tax considers the net increase in spending that a worker
experiences in switching from no work to working full time.  In
contrast to Table 1, all households face positive and substantial19
marginal net full-time work tax rates.  Indeed, the minimum wage
household faces a 33.6 percent marginal tax on working full time
even though its average tax is negative 17.8 percent.  The reason
for this large difference in average and marginal net tax rates is
that households who don’t work receive very substantial transfers.
 These transfers  are  substantially  reduced when the  households go
to work full time.  The net tax on going to work full time is
positive both because transfers are reduced and because taxes
become positive.
Households earning 1.5 or more times the minimum wage face
marginal net full-time work taxes that range between 51.1 percent
and 55.4 percent.  Hence, in going to work, the vast majority of
American households hand over slightly more than half of every
dollar they earn to state and federal government.  Moreover, the
fact that all but the lowest income workers face roughly the same
effective marginal net tax rates on full-time work means that the
distortion (excess burden) facing the vast majority of workers
associated with the decision to work full time is roughly the same
share of lifetime spending.
Half-Time Work Tax Rates
Tables 5 through 8 repeat the above analysis for half time
rather than full-time work.  Table 5 shows a very substantial
average subsidy of 121.0 percent given to minimum wage households
who work half time.  The average subsidy drops to 56.4 percent for
households earning 1.5 times the minimum wage and to 17.8 percent
for  households earning twice the minimum wage.  Higher wage
households  face positive average half-time net tax rates.  At
three times the minimum wage the net tax rate is 25.8 percent. 20
The rate rises gradually to 54.0 percent for the 40-times minimum
wage household.
Tables 6 and 7 decompose these average net tax rates of Table
5  into their different tax and transfer components.   They show
that the federal income tax generates a substantial average net
subsidy for half-time workers earning at or very close to the
minimum wage.  Medicaid is the most important transfer provided to
poor  half-time workers.  Indeed, for minimum wage households,
Medicaid provides 80 cents for every dollar of spending the
household would do in the absence of any fiscal policies.
Table 8 presents marginal net taxes on switching from zero
work to working half time.  As in Table 4, all marginal tax rates
are  positive, starting with the minimum wage household, which
faces a 13.2 percent net tax rate.  Once the household’s wage is
three or more times the minimum, the marginal tax is above 50
percent.   Again, the explanation for the positive sign of
marginal net tax rates for the poor is that even half-time work
leads to substantial increases in federal income taxes and
reductions in benefits from transfer programs.
Table 9 considers a different marginal net work tax rate,
namely that imposed on switching from half-time to full-time work.
 For very low-wage workers as a group, the loss in benefits and
the rise in taxes are so large as to eliminate almost any economic
gain from the switch.  Indeed, households earning 1.5 times the
minimum wage who switch from half- to full-time work end up
handing away 105 cents for every dollar earned!  While less than
100 percent, the net tax rate on moving from half time to full
time work is still quite large for middle-income households, but21
it  drops  substantially  with earnings for very high earners.  The
reason for the drop is intuitively clear: High earners pay federal
and state income taxes at the highest rate brackets even when
working half-time but low and middle-income households become
subject to higher marginal income tax rates upon switching from
half- to full-time work.
Net Work Tax Rates on Second Earners
Table 9’s net tax rates not only indicate the rate of net
taxation of both spouses’ earnings if both switch from half time
to full-time work.  They also indicate the net tax rate imposed on
a non-working spouse who decides to work full time and earns the
same amount as his/her partner.  From this perspective, the U.S.
fiscal system is very strongly encouraging one spouse in low-wage
married households to stay out of the labor force.  Because of
child rearing, cultural norms, and gender differences in pay, the
spouse being forced out of the work force by our fiscal system
will typically be the wife. 
 Age-Specific Net Work Tax Rates
Tables 10 through 14 present net tax rates on working at a
particular  age given that the household works at all other ages. 
The experiment  here compares a) the increase in lifetime spending
from working versus not working at a particular  age under the
current fiscal system with b) the increase in lifetime spending
from working rather than not working at that age in the absence of
all taxes and transfers.  The value [1–(a/b)]_100  equals  the tax
bite imposed on working at the age under consideration.  At 9.7
percent, the net tax rate on working at age 25 is fairly low for
minimum wage workers.  However, for workers earning just a little22
more--about 1.5 times minimum wage--working at age 25 comes with a
hefty tax rate of 59.6 percent.  Table 15 shows the changes in
different components of taxes and transfers for the experiment of
Table 10.  It shows that at age 25, those earning 1.5 times
minimum wage lose much more by way of Medicaid benefits by working
compared to those earning at the minimum wage.  In addition,
working at age 25 induces an increase in federal income taxes for
those earning 1.5 times the minimum wage whereas those earning at
the minimum wage receive a subsidy for working by way of the
earned income credit.  Table 10 shows that the net tax rate for
working at age 25 is about 45 percent for those earning between
three- to forty-times the minimum wage.  That is, the tax on
working at age 25 is roughly proportional  over most of the
earnings distribution.
A similar pattern of net tax rates by income arises for
working at age 35 except that the net tax rate falls quite steeply
at higher income levels.  The reason -- borrowing constraints are
less binding on high earners prior to age 35 because children’s
college expenses are capped for high earning households.  This
implies that high earners enjoy greater flexibility in adjusting
assets prior to age 35.  Prior asset accumulation is much greater
when not working at age 35 for high earners compared to low
earners.  But, high prior asset accumulation implies higher
capital income taxes.  Therefore, by choosing to work rather than
not at age 35, high earning households save a lot more on capital
income taxes than do middle or low income households--as is
evident from Table 16.
Table 12 shows the impact of not working at age 45.  Net23
marginal tax rates are in the teens  at low-income levels and stay
relatively  flat until 10-times-minimum-wage  level of earnings. The
tax rates rise sharply for very high earners.  By age 45,
households  have paid off children’s college expenses and are
beginning to save for retirement.  Again, low and middle income
households accumulate more assets by age 45 when not working at
age 45 compared to working at that age.  Hence, as before, they
save on capital income taxes prior to age 45 by working at age 45.
 This translates into saving on capital income taxes on a lifetime
basis for low earners.
As can be seen from Table 17, the story is somewhat different
for  high-income  individuals.  Although these households also
accumulate  more assets by age 45 when not working compared to
working at that age—thereby saving on capital income prior to age
45—this saving is more than offset by higher capital income tax
payments in later years.  The cap on college expenditures  for high
earners implies that their borrowing constraint becomes nonbinding
much earlier when they work at age 45 compared to when they do not
work.  This induces two effects:  First, the amount of capital
income taxes saved prior to age 45 is not much higher for high
earners compared to low earners.  Second, because saving for
retirement begins earlier when working at age 45 (because the
borrowing constraint become non-binding earlier), asset
accumulation is much larger prior to retirement and high earners
pay much more in capital income taxes after age 45.  Hence, high
earners pay more in capital income taxes on a lifetime basis when
working relative to not working at age 45.   This explains the
relatively  steep increase in the net marginal tax rate on working24
at age 45 at high earning levels. 
Table 13 shows that tax rates are, again, low at low earning
levels but rise sharply beginning at just 3 times minimum wage,
quickly reaching the mid-40s in percentage terms.  As is clear
from Table 18, deciding to work rather than not at age 55 extends
and somewhat magnifies the previously described effect on asset
accumulation.  Now, even low earners end up paying more in capital
income taxes on a lifetime basis when they decide to work at age
55.
Table 14 shows the results for the decision to work at age
65.  The marginal tax rate on working is roughly 20 percent for
households earning between up to twice the minimum wage and rises
sharply for households earning 3 or more times the minimum wage. 
Here, the life-cycle stage of binding borrowing constraints is
long past, and the decision to work versus not work at age 65
impacts asset accumulation in prior years as before—working at age
65 implies lower asset accumulation and, therefore a tax-saving on
account of capital income taxes.  The steep increase in marginal
tax rate on working at age 65 across those earning 3 and 4 times
the minimum wage seems to arise due to steep increases in federal
and state income taxes.
The results of this section point to important role of prior
asset  accumulation adjustments that consumption smoothing
households  would undertake when planning to take time off from
work in future years.  The particular manner in which these
adjustments  occur and interact with households’ borrowing
constraints  can sizably influence, on a lifetime basis, marginal
tax rates from working in particular years.  It should be noted25
that  ESPlanner  does not take into account the possibility of
adjusting prior year’s labor supplies when planning to work/quit
work in the future.  In general, the decision to work or not in
any future year potentially involves dynamic interactions  with
asset  accumulation,  labor supplies, and  borrowing constraints in
other years and, hence, can affect marginal work-tax rates in ways
that are difficult to model comprehensively.
Sensitivity of Net Full-Time Work Tax Rates to Assumed Discount
and Growth Rates
Tables 20 and 21 show how average and marginal net full-time
work tax rates are affected by assuming higher and lower discount
rates and growth rates than those used in the base-case
calculations.  As in the base case, we assume that the household’s
pre-tax and transfer return to saving is the same as the discount
rate and that transfer bracket levels and basic benefits are
indexed to the growth rate of real wages. 
With the exception of the average net tax rates for low-wage
households,  the results are very robust to the alternative
discount and growth assumptions.  For example, the average net
full-time  work tax rate for a household earning five times the
minimum wage is 47.2 percent.  Using a 3 (7) percent, rather than
a  5  percent discount rate, lowers (raises) the average net tax
rate to 44.9 (48.4) percent.  And assuming a zero (2 percent)
rather than a 1 percent growth rate of real wages lowers (raises)
the average net tax rate to 47.1 (48.0) percent. 
For minimum wage households, the 17.8 percent base-case
subsidy rises to 31.7 percent when a 3 percent discount rate is
used.  With a 7 percent discount rate, the subsidy falls to 14.726
percent.  Lowering the wage growth rate to zero rate lowers the
subsidy just slightly--to 15.0 percent, whereas raising wage
growth to 2 percent raises the subsidy substantially -- to 25.4
percent. 
The effects of the discount rate changes on the average net
work tax rates of low-wage households are not surprising  given
that a larger share of lifetime spending of low-wage households
consists of non fungible welfare payments, much of which arrive
late in life.  The sensitivity at the low end of the wage
distribution of average net work tax rates to wage growth rates
reflects the fact that the federal income tax, including the
earned income tax credit, is inflation rather than wage indexed. 
For low-wage households, higher real wage growth leads to real
bracket creep as well as reductions in the earned income tax
credit.  High wage households aren’t eligible for the earned
income tax bracket and aren’t subject to real bracket creep
because they are already in the top tax bracket.
The Impact of Policy Changes on Net Full-Time Work Tax Rates
Our final tables, Tables 22 and 23, consider how average and
marginal full-time net work tax rates would change in response to
the  following  four  policies: 1) a 5 percentage point cut in the
payroll tax rate, 2) the elimination of the Social Security
earnings ceiling, 3) raising the Social Security payroll tax rate
by  5  percentage points, 4) replacing federal personal and
corporate income taxes with a 25 percent consumption tax levied on
final sales, and 5) cutting Social Security benefits immediately
and permanently by 25 percent.
Cutting the Payroll Tax Rate by 5 Percentage Points27
Cutting the OASDI payroll tax rate is a key feature of
current policy proposals for privatizing Social Security.  A 5
percentage  point cut in the rate appears to be at the outer limit
of  what might ultimately be adopted.  A comparison of the base-
case results presented in column three of Table 22 with the
results for this policy experiment shown in column four indicate
that a payroll tax of this magnitude would be highly  progressive.
 Because of the ceiling on Social Security taxable earnings, the
policy makes little difference to the net tax rates facing the
rich, but it does lower the average net tax rates of middle- and
low-income households.  Take, for example, households earning
three times the minimum wage, with initial (age 22) income of
$64,300.  Their average net tax rate is 40.2 percent in the base
case and 34.0 percent under the policy reform.  And their marginal
net tax rate falls from 52.4 percent to 48.0 percent.  
Eliminating Social Security’s Earnings Ceiling
This is another progressive policy.  It makes no difference
to  the average or marginal net taxes of low-wage households, but
it  raises those of the rich.  Households earning 15 times the
minimum wage find both their average and marginal net tax rates
higher by more than 5 percentage points.  For households earning
40 times the minimum wage, the average net tax rate rises by 9.1
percentage points and the marginal rate rises by 8.8 percentage
points. 
Raising Payroll Taxes
While some policymakers wish to cut payroll taxes in the
context of privatizing Social Security, others favor securing the
system’s future by raising payroll tax rates.  However, Tables 2228
and 23 indicate that doing so in the context of a fixed ceiling on
Social Security taxable earnings would be highly regressive.  The
tables consider a 5 percentage point increase in the tax rate. 
While the policy has a small impact on top earning households,
those earning at or just above the minimum wage would bear much
higher net tax rates.  For a household earning 3 times the minimum
wage  household,  the average net tax rate rises from 40.2 percent
to 46.5 percent and their marginal net tax rate rising from 52.4
percent to 57.1 percent. 
Switching from Federal Income to Consumption Taxes
The final policy we consider is replacing federal personal
and  corporate income taxes with a 25 percent retail consumption
tax.  A 25 percent tax rate appears to be in the neighborhood of
what would be needed to maintain revenue neutrality.  In
considering  the  regressivity of these results it is important to
bear in mind that we are focusing here on households with no
initial wealth.  Were we to assume that the rich had significant
inheritances, the consumption tax would look much more progressive
because it taxes consumption spending no matter how financed.  
Given that caveat, it’s clear that consumption taxation would
raise average tax burdens on the poor and middle class and
dramatically  lower them for the rich.  Households earning twice
the minimum wage would find their average net tax rate rising by
1.6  percentage points.  In contrast, those earning 10 times the
minimum wage would experience a 12 percentage point cut in their
average tax rate. 
An  Immediate  and  Permanent  Cut In Social Security Benefits by 25
Percent29
Under current tax and benefit rules, one estimate places the
U.S. Social Security System’s present value actuarial imbalance at
more than $8 trillion.
7  One way to redress this imbalance is via a
benefit cut.  According to Social Security’s actuaries, the
required magnitude of an immediate and permanent Social Security
benefit cut would be 25 percent.  Our fifth policy explores the
implications of this policy on average and marginal net tax rates.
 Although a 25 percent benefit cut sounds like a large cut on its
own, it makes a relatively minor dent in the lifetime spending of
the young and middle-aged because it becomes effective several
decades in the future.  In addition, for relatively low income
households---those  earning up to 3 times the minimum wage—reduced
Social Security benefits trigger higher Medicaid benefits.  As a
result, such households experience very small increases, if at
all, in their average and marginal net tax rates.  Households  with
earnings between 6 and 8 times minimum wage would bear the largest
increases in average and marginal net tax rates from this policy.
 But even for these households,  the average and marginal tax-rate
changes—about 1 percentage point for both—is much smaller than
those arising from some of the other policies considered in Tables
22 and 23.
X.   Summary and Conclusion
The U.S. fiscal system is not your father’s Oldsmobile. 
Thanks to the growth of a variety interrelated of social welfare
program, it’s vastly more complicated than it was in the middle of
the last century.  Understanding  how this complexity impacts
households requires an intertemporal framework because what one
                        
7 Gokhale and Kotlikoff (2002).30
pays in taxes or receives in benefits in one year may depend more
on what happens in other periods than in the year in question. 
In using ESPlanner, a life-cycle consumption smoothing model,
to  understand lifetime average and marginal net tax burdens, we
have included in fine detail every major tax and transfer program
affecting American households.  What emerges is a picture of a
fiscal system that is highly progressive with respect to the
average burdens facing very low-wage households.  However, the
system’s generosity toward the poor extends only to those who are
very poor.  Low-income and lower middle-income households face
significant  net tax burdens primarily because the earnings and
asset tests of our welfare programs limit their availability to
all but the poorest members of society.  Another key feature of
our fiscal system is it’s roughly 50 percent average net tax rates
imposed on the earnings of upper-income  and  high-income
households. 
While very poor Americans receive subsidies, on net and on
average, they nonetheless face very high marginal net taxes on
working.  Minimum wage workers lose a third of every dollar they
earn in net taxes when they decide to work full time.  Higher wage
workers loose between 51 cents and 57 cents on every dollar
earned.  In addition, low-wage workers face confiscatory taxes in
deciding to switch from working half time to full time.  So too do
non-working low wage spouses whose partners work full time. 
Except for the net tax rates of the poor, average and
marginal net tax rates are fairly robust to different discount
rate and growth rate assumptions.  In contrast, making different
assumptions  about future fiscal policy can greatly alter both31
average and marginal net tax rates at all wage levels.  In
particular, we find that raising payroll taxes or switching to
consumption taxation would be highly regressive, while cutting
payroll taxes would be quite progressive.
Finally, we find that working when young can be much more
costly from a tax perspective than working when old, especially
for workers at the lower end of the wage distribution.  The reason
is  that, if they have time to do it and if they are planned in
advance, households will save up for work holidays.  In so doing
they will raise the taxes they end up paying on capital income at
the same time they lower the taxes they pay on their labor
earnings.   Hence, for such households, the decision to take a
year off later in life will have smaller tax consequences  than
doing so when young. 32
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Appendix
Modeling Taxes and Transfers
This appendix is divided into three sections.  Section I discusses
our  calculation of federal income, payroll, and state income
taxes.  Section II discusses our calculation of Social Security
benefits.  And Section III discusses out calculation of non-Social
Security benefits.
I. The Calculation of Taxes
The Federal Income Tax
Esplanner’s  calculations of federal income taxes in each future
year assumes that the household ‘s filing status is “married and
filing jointly” for married households and “single” for single
households.  “Single” is assumed when spouses of married
households  are by themselves—as is the case when one spouse
outlives the other at the end of the planning horizon or when
calculating the financial plan for one of the spouses as a part of
a  surviving household. All federal income tax calculations are
based on the new 2001 tax law, which we assume is not phased out
at  the end of the decade, but, rather is maintained after 2010
with its 2010 provisions.
All tax calculations  are made based on nominal income levels by
converting  real pre-tax income amounts to their nominal
counterparts based on the assumed rate of inflation.  Thus, if the
user inputs a 3 percent inflation rate, all nominal amounts in the
user’s federal income tax calculation (such as nominal bracket
amounts and nominal exemption amounts) are multiplied by 1.03
percent for purposes of calculating 2002 taxes, by 1.03 times 1.03
for purposes of calculating 2003 taxes, and so on.  The federal
income tax schedule is applied to the program’s calculation of
federal taxable income.  Federal taxable income equals federal
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) less personal exemptions  and less the
standard deduction of the sum of itemized deductions, whichever is
larger.
The AGI for each year includes projected incomes in current
dollars from several sources. These are: labor income (wages and
salaries),  self-employment  income, asset income projected by the
program based on user inputs of initial non-tax-favored  net  worth
and rates of return, and on the optimal spending plan computed by
the program.  AGI also includes taxable asset income, taxable
social security benefits, taxable special receipts, taxable
distributions  from defined benefit pension plans and  taxable
withdrawals from tax-favored saving plans.  Each of these items is
based upon the user’s inputs and preferences.  Non-taxable special
receipts and withdrawals from Roth IRA accounts are not included
in  AGI.  Deductible contributions to retirement accounts are
subtracted  from income in calculating each year’s AGI.  Employer
contributions to retirement accounts are not included in AGI. 
However, withdrawals from these accounts are included. 34
The Indexation of the Tax Schedule 
Tax-rate brackets and infra-marginal  tax amounts (all of the
dollar amounts listed in the tax schedules) are adjusted for
inflation in each year over the household’s lifetime.  This is
done to ensure that the schedule keeps pace with the growth of
income in current dollars.  The indexation is done using the user-
specified  rate of inflation.  The thresholds  for taxing Social
Security benefits are not indexed for inflation in accordance with
current policy.
Standard Deductions and Exemptions
Standard deductions and exemptions are also indexed for inflation
for each future year based on the user-specified future rate of
inflation. The number of personal exemptions allowed equals 2 plus
the number of children for “married and filing jointly” and 1 plus
the number of children for the “single” filing statuses.
The personal exemption amount that can be deducted from AGI in
calculating taxable income is phased out if AGI is above certain
dollar limits depending upon the filing status. ESPlanner  takes
into account the phase-out of personal exemptions based on these
dollar limits indexed for inflation.  The year-by-year phase-in of
changes in the phase-out provisions enacted in the 2001 tax reform
are included in ESPlanner’s tax calculating code.
The Decision to Itemize
ESPlanner  takes the maximum of the standard deduction or sum of
itemized deductions, where the latter includes mortgage interest
payments, property taxes, state and local income tax payments, and
tax-deductible  special deductible expenditures that the  user
specifies,  such as charitable contributions. Note that state and
local income tax payments are deductible only if they are being
withheld from pay or the user makes estimated tax payments during
the tax year. ESPlanner assumes withholding or pre-payment.
The Phase-Out of Itemized Deductions
As modified in the 2001 tax reform, federal income tax rules phase
out itemized deductions for high-income taxpayers (both, married
filing jointly and single payers).  The reduction does not apply
to  certain components of the itemized deductions claimed—such as
medical care expenses, investment interest, and casualty and theft
losses. Because ESPlanner  does not distinguish between these and
other sources of itemized deductions, the phase-out rules are
applied to all itemized deductions.
The Child-Tax Credit
The child-tax credit depends on the number of qualifying  children
in the household.  The tax credit is phased out if AGI is over a
threshold,  the value of which depends on marital status.  The
phase-out  rate is $50 for each $1000 of income in excess of the
applicable threshold.  The amount of the child-tax credit equals
the smaller of a) the computed amount or b) the federal income tax
liability  net of the earned income tax credit.  If the earned
income tax credit exceeds the federal income tax liability, the
child-tax credit is applied against payroll taxes.35
The Earned Income Tax Credit
The  program’s calculation of the earned income tax credit (EITC)
adheres to the EITC worksheet in federal Form 1040.  ESPlanner
first checks for eligibility to receive the EITC based on a)
investment income, b) taxable earned income, c) non-taxable earned
income (e.g., employer 401(k) contributions), d) earned  income
thresholds  for households  with no qualifying  children,  and  earned
income thresholds for households with at least one qualifying
child.  Next, the EITC is computed based on the EITC schedule for
taxable and nontaxable income and the household’s level of
adjusted gross income (AGI).
The Taxation of Social Security Benefits
Social Security benefits are included in the federal income-tax
base in the following manner.  If the sum of AGI and 50 percent of
Social Security benefits falls short of a lower threshold, which
is marital-status specific, then none of the benefits are taxable.
 If  the sum exceeds the applicable dollar threshold,  but the
excess is less than a martial-status specific sum, the smaller of
one-half of the excess or 50 percent of the benefit is taxable and
is included in the federal income tax base.  In addition, if the
aforementioned excess is greater than the second dollar threshold,
85 percent of this excess or 85 percent of the benefit, whichever
is smaller, is also added to the federal income tax base.
The Low Income Tax Credit for Retirement Account Contributions
This non-refundable tax credit was introduced in the 2001 tax law.
 The credit  reimburses X percent of the individual’s  first  $2,000
in  contributions to retirement accounts. The value of X for
households with very low incomes is 50 percent, but quickly phases
out to zero at higher income levels.
Payroll Taxes
For purposes of this study, ESPlanner’s  payroll tax calculator is
modified to incorporate employer-paid payroll taxes.  In each
year, the payroll tax for a married household is the sum of the
two spouses’ payroll taxes.  Each spouse’s tax equals the employee
plus employer 12.4 percent OASDI tax rate applied to labor
earnings up to the taxable maximum level plus the employee plus
employer 2.9 percent HI tax rate applied to all labor earnings. 
Massachusetts State Income Taxes
Massachusetts  taxes labor and interest and dividend income at a
5.95%  rate.
8  The tax base includes earnings from wages and
salaries,  self-employment  income, pension income, and
distributions  from  tax-favored  saving accounts, and other taxable
receipts such as alimony.  Federally taxable Social Security
benefits are not included.  A rental deduction, available to both
single and joint filers, is allowed up to 50 percent of rent paid
on one’s principal residence or $2,500, whichever is smaller.   A
single $1,200 deduction is allowed for dependent children under
the age of 12.  Capital gains are taxed at a lower rate, but this
feature of the Massachusetts tax code is not explicitly modeled. 
                        
8 We ignore scheduled future reductions in Massachusetts income tax rates from
5.95 percent to 5.0 percent.  Given the current fiscal crisis in
Massachusetts, this tax cut is likely to be repealed.36
II.  The Calculation of Social Security Benefits
Social Security Retirement Benefits
Eligibility
Before  ESPlanner  provides household heads and spouses Social
Security retirement benefits, it checks that they are fully
insured.  Individuals  must be fully insured to  receive  retirement
benefits based on their earnings records.  Becoming fully insured
requires sufficient contributions at a job  (including  self-
employment) covered by Social Security. For those born after 1929,
acquiring 40 credits  prior to retirement suffices for fully
insured status.  Earnings between 1937 and 1951 are aggregated and
divided by $400, and the result (rounded down to an integer
number) are the pre-1952 credits which are added to the credits
earned after 1950 in determining insured status.  After 1951,
workers earn one credit for each quarter of the year they work in
Social  Security-covered  employment  and earn above a specified
minimum amount.  The year of first  eligibility  for  retirement
benefits is the year in which the individual becomes age 62.  The
individual is entitled to retirement benefits after an application
for benefits is submitted, but never before age 62.
Determination of Primary Insurance Amount (PIA)
The PIA is the basis for all benefit payments made on a worker’s
earnings record. There are several steps in computing the PIA.
Base  years  are computed as the years after 1950 up to the first
month of entitlement to retirement benefits begins. For survivor
benefits, base years include the year of the worker's death.
Elapsed Years
Elapsed years are computed as those years after 1950 (or after
attainment of age 21, whichever occurs later) up to (but not
including)  the year of first eligibility.  The maximum number of
elapsed years for an earnings record is 40 (it could be shorter,
for purposes of calculating survivor benefits if the person dies
prior to age 62).
Computation Years
Computation  years are calculated as the number of elapsed years
less five or 2, whichever is the greater.  Earnings in base years
(up to the maximum taxable limit in each year, and through age 60
or  two years prior to death, whichever occurs earlier) are
wage-indexed according to economy-wide average wages. Of these,
the highest earnings in years equaling the number of computation
years are added together and the sum is divided by the number of
months in computation years to yield Average Indexed Monthly
Earnings (AIME).
Bend Points
The AIME is converted into a PIA using a formula with bend  points.
 The bend point formula is specified as 90 percent of the first X
dollars of AIME plus 32 percent of the next Y dollars of AIME plus
15 percent of the AIME in excess of Y dollars.  The dollar amounts
X  and Y are also wage indexed and are different for different
eligibility  years. The dollar amounts pertaining to the year of37
attaining  age 60 (or, for survivor benefits, the second year
before death, whichever is earlier) are applied in computing the
PIA.
Benefits
A  person who begins to collect benefits at his or her "normal
retirement age" (currently age 65) receives the PIA as the monthly
retirement benefit.  In subsequent years, the monthly benefit is
adjusted according to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to maintain
its purchasing power.
Increases in Normal Retirement Ages
After 2003 normal retirement ages are scheduled to increase by 2
months for every year that a person’s 65th birthday occurs later
than the year 2003.  This progressive increase in the normal
retirement  age for those born later ceases between the years 2008
through 2020; those attaining age 65 in these years have a normal
retirement age of 66.  The postponement in retirement ages resumes
after 2020 such that those born after 2025 have a normal
retirement  age of 67.  All cohorts attaining age 65 after that
year have a normal retirement age of 67.
  
Reductions for Age
A  person who begins to collect retirement benefits earlier than
the normal retirement age receives a reduction  for  age.  The
reduction factor is 5/9 of 1 percent for each month of entitlement
prior to the normal retirement age. The reduced benefit payment
(except for the inflation adjustment) continues even after the
person reaches or surpasses the normal retirement age. If the
number of months of reduction exceeds 36 months (for example, in
case of entitlement at age 62 when the normal retirement age is
67), then the reduction factor is 5/12 of 1 percent for every
additional month of early entitlement.
  
Delayed Retirement Credits
Those who begin to collect benefits after their normal retirement
age (up to age 70) receive delayed retirement credits. The amount
of  the delayed retirement credit for each month of delayed
entitlement depends on the year in which a person attains normal
retirement  age. For example, those attaining age 65 in 1997
receive an additional 5 percent in monthly benefits for each year
of  delay in entitlement. However, those attaining age 65 in the
year 2008 will receive an additional 8 percent in benefits for
each year of delayed entitlement.
Earnings Test
If  a  person continues to work and earn after the month of
entitlement  and the person is under age 65, benefits are reduced
because of an earnings  test.    Beneficiaries  lose $1 for each $2
earned above an earnings limit.  The earnings limits are scheduled
to  grow with average wages in subsequent years.  All benefits
payable on a worker’s earnings record, including the worker’s own
retirement benefits and spousal and child dependent benefits, are
proportionally reduced by the testing of the worker’s earnings.
Recomputation of Benefits
Earnings in any year after entitlement to benefits are38
automatically taken into account in a recomputation of the PIA for
determining  the  subsequent year's benefit amount. However, these
earnings are not indexed before they are included in the AIME
calculation. If such earnings are higher than some prior year's
earnings (indexed earnings through age 60 or unindexed earnings
after age 60), they result in an increase in the PIA and benefit
payable. If they are lower than all previous year's earnings, they
will not lower the PIA or benefits since only the highest earnings
in base years are included in the calculations.
Spousal and Child Dependent Benefits
Eligibility
Wives and husbands of insured workers (including divorced spouses)
are entitled to spousal  benefits if the couple was married for at
least 10 years at the time of application for spousal benefits,
the spouse is over age 62 or has in care a child under age 16
entitled to benefits under the insured worker's record, and the
insured worker is collecting retirement benefits. Children of
insured workers under age 16 are entitled to child  dependent
benefits  if  the child is unmarried and the worker is collecting
retirement benefits.
Benefits
Spousal and child benefits equal 50 percent of the insured
worker's PIA (each). Child dependent benefits may be lower only if
the  family  maximum  applies. Spousal benefits may be lower due to
the family maximum, a reduction for age, the application of the
earnings test, or the spouse’s receipt of retirement benefits
based or her or his own earnings record.
Family Maximum
All benefits paid under a worker's record (except retirement
benefits or  divorced spousal benefits) are reduced
proportionately to bring them within the family maximum benefit
level. The maximum benefits payable on a worker's earnings record
is determined by applying a bend point formula to the PIA similar
to that applied to the AIME in calculating the PIA. For example,
the family maximum equals 150 percent of the first $X of PIA plus
272 percent of the next $Y of the PIA plus 134 percent of the next
$Z of the PIA plus 175 percent of the PIA greater than $X+$Y+$Z.
The values X, Y, and Z are adjusted for each year of the
calculation according to the growth in economy-wide  average  wages.
In  case the spousal benefit is eliminated  for any reason, the
benefits payable on the insured worker's  record are subjected to
the family maximum test again, treating the spouse as though
he/she were not eligible for spousal benefits. This may result in
higher benefits for children who may be eligible for dependent
benefits under the worker's record.
Reduction of Spousal Benefits for Age
Spouses eligible for the spousal benefit may elect to receive (may
become entitled for) their benefits before normal retirement age.
In this case the spousal benefit is reduced by 25/36 of 1 percent
for each month of entitlement prior to normal retirement age. If
the number of months of reduction exceeds 36 months (for example,39
in case of entitlement at age 62 when the normal retirement  age is
67), then the reduction factor is 5/12 of 1 percent for every
additional month of early entitlement.
Earnings Testing of Spousal Benefits
If  a  spouse is earning above the amount allowed by the earnings
test, the spousal benefits he or she is eligible to receive will
be  earnings tested according to the pre- and post-normal
retirement schedule described above.
Redefinition of Spousal Benefits
If a spouse is already collecting retirement benefits, the spousal
benefit is redefined as the greater of the excess of the spousal
benefit over the spouse's own retirement benefit or zero.
Survivor Benefits (Widow(er), Father/Mother, and Children)
Eligibility
The  surviving spouse of a deceased worker is eligible for
widow(er)  benefits  if  the  widow(er) is at least age 60, is
entitled (has applied for widow[er] benefits), the worker died
fully insured, and the widow(er) was married to the deceased
worker for at least 9 months. The widow(er) of a deceased worker
is  eligible for father/mother  benefits  if  the  widow(er) is
entitled to benefits (has applied), the worker died fully insured,
the widower has in care a child of the worker. A surviving child
is  eligible for  child survivor benefits  on  the deceased worker's
record if the child is under age 18 and is entitled (an
application has been filed) and the worker was fully insured.
Survivor Benefits
Monthly benefits equal 100 percent of the worker's PIA for a
widow(er);  they equal 75 percent of the PIA for father/mother and
child survivor benefits. Widow(er) and child survivor benefits may
be lower only if the family maximum applies. Widow(er)s may become
entitled to (elect to receive) survivor benefits earlier than
normal retirement age, but not earlier than age 60. In this case
the reduction is 19/40 of 1 percent for each month of entitlement
prior to normal retirement age. After the widow(er) is 62, he or
she is may become entitled to (elect to receive) retirement
benefits based on her own past covered earnings record. In this
case the widow(er) benefits are redefined as the excess over own
retirement benefit or zero, whichever is greater. Finally,
widow(er) survivor and own retirement benefits are also subject to
the earnings test. If the deceased worker was already collecting a
reduced retirement insurance benefit, the widow(er)'s benefit
cannot be greater than the reduced widow(er) benefit or the
greater of 82.5 percent of the worker's PIA or the worker's own
retirement benefit. If the deceased worker was already collecting
a  retirement insurance benefit greater than the PIA because of
delayed retirement, the widow(er) or is granted the full dollar
amount of the delayed retirement credit over and above the
(reduced) widow(er) benefit. Father/mother benefits are not
similarly augmented by delayed retirement credits that the
deceased worker may have been receiving.40
Father/Mother Benefits
These benefits may be reduced if the family maximum applies or if
the father or mother is entitled to the own retirement benefit. In
this case the father/mother  benefit is redefined as the  excess
over the father or mother’s own retirement benefit or zero,
whichever is greater. Father /mother benefits are also subject to
the earnings test. On the other hand, they are not reduced for
age. For those eligible to receive both widow(er) and
father/mother benefits, the program calculates both and takes the
larger benefit.
Calculation of a Deceased Worker's PIA
The  calculation of survivor benefits in the case of a widow(er)
benefits uses the larger of two alternative calculation’s of the
deceased worker's PIA. These are the "wage indexing" method and
the  "re-indexing"  method. Moreover, the year up to which the
worker's wages are indexed may be different depending upon whether
the deceased worker would have become age 62 before or after the
widow(er) attains age 60.
The Wage-Indexing Method
The last year for indexing earnings is the earlier of a) the year
the worker dies minus 2 years or b) the year worker would have
attained age 60. Bend point formula dollar amounts are taken from
the earlier of the year the worker dies or the year the worker
would have attained age 62. The PIA thus calculated is inflated by
the CPI up to the year the widow(er) turns age 60 (if later) to
obtain the PIA value on which widower benefits would be based.
Where  applicable,  these benefits are then adjusted for the family
maximum, reduction for age, delayed retirement credits, and the
earnings test.
The Re-indexing Method
The worker's original earnings are indexed up to the earlier of
the year the widow(er) attains age 58 or b) the year the worker
attains age 60. The elapsed years are computed as the number of
years from 1951 (or the worker's age 22 if later) through the year
the widow(er) attains age 60. The computation years equal elapsed
years minus 5 years (computation years cannot be less than 2).
Bend point formula dollar values are applied from the year the
widow(er) attains age 60. There is no subsequent indexing of the
PIA for inflation.
The Sequencing of Widow(er) Benefit Calculations
Widow(er) benefit reductions proceed in a particular sequence:
First the widow(er) plus children's benefits are subjected to the
family maximum. Second, the widow(er) benefit is reduced for early
entitlement  (of the widow(er) prior to normal retirement age).
Third, the widow(er) benefit is compared to the widow(er) own
retirement benefit if entitled to the latter. Fourth, the
widow(er) benefit is redefined as the excess over own benefit if
own benefit is positive. Finally the earning's test is applied,
first to the widow(er)'s own benefit and then to the widow(er)
benefit that is in excess of own benefit. If the widow(er) benefit
is eliminated as a result of these tests, the benefits payable on
the insured worker's  record are subjected to the family maximum41
test again, treating the widow(er) as though he/she were not
eligible for the widow(er) benefit. This procedure can potentially
increase children's benefits if the family maximum limit was
binding the first time through.
III. The Calculation of Non-Social Security Benefits
The  calculation of non Social Security benefits occurs in two
stages.  First, fungible (cash) benefits are calculated  within
ESPlanner  taking into account each fungible benefit programs’
asset and income tests and eligibility restrictions.  Second, the
household’s non-fungible benefits in each year are  calculated
based on the household’s asset accumulation  and income path as
determined by ESPlanner.  While  non-fungible benefits are not
incorporated in ESPlanner’s  consumption smoothing optimization,
they are included in the calculation of average and marginal net
tax rates.  Specifically, in the formulae for those tax rates
specified above, the non-fungible benefits in a particular year
are treated as additional spending in that year for purposes of
determining  the expected present values of spending when the
fiscal system is assumed to be operational.
The first stage calculations  involve dynamic programming in which
fungible benefit levels are determined in each year for each
possible level of household assets and income in that year.  This
first stage also includes the calculation of federal income, state
income, and payroll taxes. 
The fungible benefits incorporated in ESPlanner’s  consumption
smoothing are:
-  Social Security Retirement, Spousal, Survivor, Mother, Father,
Child, and Divorcee Benefits
-  Transitional Assistance to Families with Dependent Children
(TAFDC)
-  Supplementary Security Income (SSI)
-  Housing Assistance Programs
-  Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP)
 
  The  non-fungible benefits calculated in the second stage and
treated as additional spending are:
-  Food Stamps (FS)





  Family Composition and Benefit Eligibility
  In  computing  how much fungible and non-fungible benefits are
available to particular households in a particular year, we take
into account how eligibility for particular benefits within each
program depends on the size and composition of the family.  For
example, in a year when a couple has two children at home with
them,  eligibility is defined based on the income standards for a
family of four; but when the children have left the household upon
reaching age 19, it’s defined based on the income standards for a42
family of two.
 
  Asset Tests
  We  include asset tests for each type of benefit that stipulates




Program Asset Test Limits
TAFDC $2,500 for a family
SSI $2,000 for a single; $ 3,000 for a couple
Medicaid no asset test under 65; over 65 same as SSI
QMB/SLMB $ 4 , 000  for a single; $ 6 , 000  for a couple
Food Stamps$ 2 , 000   for a family  with members under 60 / $ 3 , 000   for a family  with memb
 
  Pre-paid funeral arrangements, up to a certain limit, are  usually
treated as non-countable assets.  In implementing our asset tests,
we assume that the first $3,000 in assets held by a couple is
exempt from the asset test and treated a funeral arrangement.
 
  Our asset test calculates, for each program, the amount of assets
in excess of that program’s asset limit and reduces that program’s
benefits by the amount of excess assets, with the maximum
reduction being the entire benefit. Such reduction in benefit is
equivalent to the cases when individual, after being disqualified
for a number of months from receiving benefits and after spending
down his/her excess assets, gains eligibility and applies again
for the benefit. In case of receiving medical assistance,
government typically pays the bill for the qualified individuals
only after such individuals pay first the amount equivalent to
their excess assets.
 
  Growth in Benefits Over Time
  In  our  explanation of the benefits calculation below, we omit a
description of our adjustment of real benefit levels in light of
growth over time in economy-wide living standards.  But we do make
such an adjustment.  Specifically, we assume that all  benefit
amounts, brackets, premiums, and deductions grow in real terms at
the assumed rate of labor productivity.  In our base case, this
rate is 1 percent. 
 
  Adjusting for the Probability of Benefit Receipt
  In our analysis we incorporate the probability of benefit receipt
in  the case of benefits triggered by illness (e.g., Medicare and
Medicaid benefits) or that come from the rationing of program
participation  (e.g., Housing Assistance, the Low Income Housing
Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), and the Special Supplemental
Nutrition Program For Women, Infants And Children (WIC)).  For
both types of programs, we first determine the average benefit
(net of the asset test) per recipient in a particular program and
then multiply by the probability of actually receiving the benefit
in question. 
 
  In  forming our measures of average benefits received, we assume43
that our household members apply for all benefits for which they
may  potentially be eligible. For example, when we calculate
average Medicaid benefits received by 70-year old males who meet
the Medicaid income-eligibility  test, we assume that all such
males apply for those benefits.  As another example, in the case
of  Housing Assistance, we assume that all income-eligible
households apply, but that their chance of receiving the average
housing benefit obtained by actual recipients equals the ratio of
the number of recipient households to the number of applicant
households.
 
  Modeling Specific Benefit Programs
 
  Each program has eligibility rules and benefit formulae that deal
with special cases.   We consider the rules and benefit formulae
that apply to the standard cases.  We describe below the
eligibility  rules and benefit formulae for each of the transfer
programs.
 
  Transitional Aid to Families with Dependent Children -- TAFDC
  Transitional  Aid to Families with Dependent Children (TAFDC) is a
cash  assistance program designed to assist needy families with
dependent child or pregnant women. TAFDC is the formal name in
Massachusetts of the program formerly known as AFDC (Aid to
Families with Dependent Children).  Most states have adopted the
name  Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).  The terms
“transitional”  and  “temporary” reflect the new objective of the
programs, namely to provide short-term assistance to needy
families and to encourage such families to return to the labor
force. Under the current rules of the TAFDC, eligible household
may generally receive assistance for no more than 24 months within
any 5-year period.
 
  There are several steps in defining eligibility for benefits. The
calculations  needed to determine eligibility, both non  financial
and financial,  and benefit levels can be complicated even for the
standard cases we consider.
 
  Non-Financial Eligibility requires that the child must be deprived
of  the care or support of at least one parent.  Deprivation
factors include: death, continued absence, physical or mental
incapacity, unemployment or underemployment of (a)  parent(s).  A
dependent child may be under age 19 or, if a full-time school




  To  meet requirements for
Financial Eligibility a
household must pass two
income tests. First, family
unit gross income cannot
exceed 185 percent of the
Need Standard that applies




Eligibility Standard  (185% 
of the Need Standard)
Need Standard / Payment 
Standard
2 958 518
31 , 143 618
41 , 319 713
TAFDC Financial Eligibility Stan44
deductions cannot exceed the Need Standard itself.
 
  Standard monthly deductions include
-  a $90 deduction for each employed family member.
-  an extra $30 plus one-half of gross income above $120 deduction
for the employed TAFDC benefit recipients or applicants who
received benefits in the previous 4 months.
-  dependent-care deductions that range between $50 to $200 for a
child under two and $44-$175 for a child 2 or over, depending on
the hours worked by a recipient.
We  applied the $90 deduction per working individual for all 12
months of each year of eligibility and the maximum deduction
levels for childcare for children between ages 1 and 5.  However,
we did not implement the extra deduction to avoid complications in
our dynamic programming algorithm.
If the family unit passes both income tests it gets financial
assistance defined as the difference between the maximum payment
standard and net income after deductions.  In accordance with
standard program restrictions on the length of benefit receipt, we
limited the receipt of benefits to no more than 24 months within
any five-year period.  Hence, for those of our stylized households
who are eligible for assistance, benefits follow a cyclical
pattern: two years on followed by three years off, provided the
asset test criterion is met. Hitting the TAFDC asset test limits,
however, would disqualify household for receiving benefits for
certain period in one of the years and would result in
modification of TAFDC lifetime benefits pattern in levels and/or
in timing. TAFDC regulation in Massachusetts assumes that families
receiving benefits may also receive $40 of monthly housing
allowance, which we add on top of the monthly TAFDC benefit.
Sources
1. Aid To Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).  Massachusetts
Bar Association. Internet: http://massbar.org/lawhelp/afdc.html
2. Transitional Aid to Families with Dependent Children (TAFDC).
Regulations. Department of Transitional Assistance.
Massachusetts. Internet:
http://www.state.ma.us/dta/dtatoday/policy/TAFDC/TAFDCINDEX.HTM
3. Gretchen G. Kirby, et al. Income Support and Social Services for
Low-Income People in Massachusetts. Urban Institute, 1997.
Internet: http://newfederalism.urban.org/html/MAincome1.html
4. Gretchen G. Kirby, et al. Income Support and Social Services for
Low-Income People in Massachusetts.  Urban Institute, 1998.
Internet:
  http://newfederalism.urban.org/html/Highlights/isss_ma.html
5. Key State TANF Policies Affecting Microenterprise.
Massachusetts. Center for Law and Social Policy, 1999. Internet:
http://www.clasp.org/pubs/jobseducation/casestud.htm#Mass
Supplementary Security Income (SSI)
Supplementary  Security Income is a federal program that makes
monthly payments to people who have limited income and resources45
if they are 65 or older or are disabled.  In our study we ignore
payments to the disabled.  If individuals meet the program's
income limits, after deductions, they receive monthly benefits. 
Payments up to the Federal income limits are received from the
federal government, while states provide supplements that are
calculated as the difference between Federal and state income
limits. In 2001, income limits in Massachusetts were $659 and $998
for an individual and a couple correspondingly.
Standard deductions are $20 per month plus the sum of a) an
additional $65 per month if labor income exceeds $65 per month and
b) one-half of wages over $65.  In Massachusetts, an SSI-eligible
person is automatically enrolled in Medicaid.
For every year we first determine age eligibility for each spouse,
and then income eligibility for the household.  When both are
eligible, their combined benefit equals the difference between the
income limit for a two-person household and the spouses’ combined
income after deductions.  When only one spouse is age eligible,
the eligible spouse’s benefit is calculated according to the
regulations  using either an individual- or couple-income limit
depending on the level of the income of the ineligible spouse. The
SSI asset test was implemented as described above.
Sources
1. A Desktop Guide To SSI Eligibility Requirements. Social Security
Administration. 2000. Internet:
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/11001.html;
2. SSI In Massachusetts. Social Security Administration, 2000;
3. Code of Federal Regulations. Title 20--Employees' Benefits.
CHAPTER III--Social Security Administration. Part 416--
Supplemental Security Income For The Aged, Blind, And Disabled.
Social Security Administration, 1999. Internet:
http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/cfr20/416/416-0000.htm
4. 1999 SSI Annual Report.  Social Security Administration.
Internet: http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/SSIR/SSI99/ssiTOC.html
Food Stamps
The purpose of the Food Stamp Program is to improve the diet of
low-income families by increasing their food purchasing power. 
Households  must satisfy both state and federal requirements to
qualify for food stamps.  There are several steps in determining
program eligibility and calculating the value of the stamp
benefits.
First, gross monthly (earned and unearned) income cannot exceed
the limits specified in the table below for households of
different sizes.  Unearned income includes Social Security and
private pension benefits, SSI benefits, unemployment  insurance
benefits,  and TAFDC payments.  In our study we include SSI and
TAFDC payments as part of the income used to calculate the value
of food stamps.
The following monthly deductions apply:46
-  $134 per household.
-  20 percent of gross income.
-  Dependent day care: under 2 years of age, up to $200 per month;
over 2 years of age, up to $175 per month. We apply here the
TAFDC program dependent care deduction for every child between
the ages of 1 and 5.
-  Medical expenses of individuals over 60 years old are deductible
beyond the first $35. These expenses were calculated as the sum
of  payments for prescription  drugs, Medicare premiums,
deductibles, and coinsurance payments (see below).
-  Excess housing costs, which are defined as housing expenses in
excess of half of the household's income after other deductions.
 Prior to age 60 there is a maximum level of $300 for deductible
excess housing costs. We included Housing Assistance benefits







limits given in the
table below.  The
value of the stamps
is the maximum
monthly  allotment
less 30 percent of net income.  The 30 percent figure reflects the
expectation  that  recipient households will spend about 30 percent
of their resources on food.
As indicated, calculating the annual value of Food Stamps benefits
for Medicare recipients requires adjusting for Medicare
deductibles  and  co-insurance payments.  The  co-insurance  payments
depend on actual utilization of medical services.  Our estimate of
Food Stamp benefits is determined by the weighted average of four
possible medical outcomes; the husband and only the husband
receives medical services subject to Medicare co-payments; the
wife and only the wife receives medical services subject to
Medicare co-payments; both spouses receive medical services
subject to Medicare co-payments; and neither spouse receives
medical services subject to Medicare co-payments.
In  calculating  the Food Stamp benefits for the three cases in
which one or both spouses receive Medicare-covered  medical
services, we assume that all medical services are paid for in a
single month that differs for the two spouses.
The weights used in forming the weighted average benefit are
determined by the age-specific probabilities of the husband and
wife receiving Medicare benefits in each year.
As  explained above, Food Stamp benefits, because they are not
fungible,  were not included in ESPlanner’s  consumption  smoothing
which is used to generate each household’s lifetime profile of tax
payments and asset accumulation.  However, this asset accumulation
Under 60 years
Over 60 years or 
disabled
1 905 1,149 696 130
21 , 219 1,548 938 238
31 , 534 1,947 1,180 341
41 , 847 2,344 1,421 434
Food Stamps: Financial Eligibility Sta









profile is used to implement the Food Stamps asset test.  We apply
this test by simply reducing benefits from that program by the
value of excess assets in each year.
Sources




2.  Do You Qualify for Food Stamps? Do You Know Someone Who May?
“Long Form” Qualification Test. The Food Stamp Program, 1999.
 Internet: http://www.foodusa.org/long2000.html
3.  Food Stamps. San Luis Obispo County Department of Social
Services, 2000. Internet:
http://www.slodss.org/Food%20Stamps/FSmain.htm
4.  1999 SSI Annual Report. SSA. Internet:
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/SSIR/SSI99/ssiTOC.html
5.  United States Department of Agriculture. Internet:
http://www.usda.gov/
Food Stamps Deduction for Out-of-Pocket Expenditures on
Prescription Drugs
The elderly spend a considerable  part of their income on the
prescription  drugs. Most are covered by one or another form of
private or public medical insurance that pays for part or all of
prescriptions.  However, about one-third of the  Medicare
beneficiaries have no insurance-drug coverage from any source.
The Food Stamp program provides a deduction for the elderly
against income based on out-of-pocket health expenses.  From the
sources listed below, we estimated relative profiles by age of
out-of-pocket  spending on prescription drugs in 1996 for the
elderly.  We did this separately for those who were covered by
drug  insurance  and those who were not.  We then applied these
profiles to the average estimated 1999 values of out-of-pocket
expenditures by different groups of Medicare beneficiaries to
obtain age- and sex-specific  average  out-of-pocket  prescription
drug  expenditures  for the following two groups: those covered by
Medicaid and those having other coverage, including no coverage.
Next we inflated those values to get to 2001 levels. 
Corresponding  monthly amounts were deducted in determining net
income used to calculate food stamp benefits as medical-related
deductions for individuals over 60. Annual values are given in the
table below; we extended average prescription drug expenditures of
the group aged 65-70 to the group of 60-64.48
MWMW
60-69 199 233 361 426
70-74 209 244 410 483
75-79 252 295 440 519
80-84 241 282 456 537
> 85 256 299 455 536
2001 Estimates of the Out-of-pocket Expence
Medicaid eligib Others age
Sources
1.  “Universal Prescription Drug Benefit Necessary to Ensure
Affordable Coverage for All Medicare Beneficiaries”.  HCFA.
March 2000. Internet:
http://www.hcfa.gov/childhealth/news/pr2000/pr000306.htm
1.  “Out-of-Pocket-Spending on Prescription Drugs by Women and
Men Age 65 And Older: 1999 projections”.  Prepared by Mary
Gilbson and Lisa Foley. AARP. April 2000.
2.  “Effects Of Prescription Drug Coverage On Spending And
Utilization”. Internet:
http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/drugstudy/chap02.htm
1.  Testimony of Michael Hash, Deputy Administrator HCFA, on
Prescription  Drug Coverage for Medicare Beneficiaries  before
the House Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Health &
Environment. September 28, 1999. Internet:
http://www.hcfa.gov/testimony/1999990928.htm
Special  Supplemental Nutrition Program For Women, Infants And
Children (WIC)
WIC is a program designed to improve the health of pregnant women,
new mothers, and their infants. WIC targets population groups that
have low income and are at risk nutritionally, specifically:
-  pregnant women through pregnancy and up to 6 weeks after birth
or after pregnancy ends
-  breastfeeding women through their infant's first birthday;
-  infants through their first birthday.
-  children up to age 5.
WIC benefits include: supplemental nutrition, nutrition
counseling,  and  screening services.  In most WIC State agencies,
WIC participants receive either actual food items or food vouchers
to  purchase specific foods to supplement their diets.  Different
food packages are provided for different categories of
participants.
Although federally funded, WIC is administrated by state agencies
and managed by local agencies.  The WIC Program has certain
eligibility requirements that are based on income and nutritional
risk.  In order to qualify, WIC applicants must show medically
verified evidence of health or nutrition risk. In addition, their
family income generally must be below 185 percent of the federal
poverty level (FPL).  Certain applicants can be judged income-
eligible for WIC based on their participation in Food Stamps,49
Medicaid, and AFDC/TANF programs.
WIC does not serve all eligible individuals - participation is
limited by the availability of Federal funding.  Usually, program
applicants  are ranked by need.  The program is estimated to serve
about 81 percent of women, infant, and child applicants.
The reported 2000 average monthly WIC benefit for actually WIC
recipients  (be they women, infants, or children) in Massachusetts
is $29. For the nation as a whole, the average monthly WIC benefit
is  estimated at $33.  In our model for simplicity, when the
household is eligible for Food Stamp benefits, we assume the
family also applies for WIC.  Pregnant women, infants, and young
children are allocated the average WIC benefit with an 81 percent
probability.  The annual value of the $29 multiplied by .81 is
$282. 
Sources
1.  Women, Infants And Children. U. S. Department of Agriculture.
2000. Internet:  http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/menu/faq/faq.htm
2.  WIC  Program.  Food And Nutrition Service. Program Data.
Internet: http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/wichome.htm
3.  1998 Green Book. Program Descriptions. Internet:
http://aspe.hhs.gov/98gb/15bother.htm
Medicare
Medicare is a federal health insurance program for the aged and
disabled (we ignore disability benefits and focus on the benefits
for the aged only). It incorporates  two parts: Hospital Insurance
(HI), also known as “Part A”, and Supplementary  Medical  insurance
(SMI), also known as “Part B”. Hospital Insurance is generally
provided  automatically to individuals aged 65 and over who are
entitled to Social Security benefits. Part A helps pay for: care
in  hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, hospice, and some home
health care. Enrolling in SMI is optional; part B helps pay for:
doctors, outpatient hospital care, clinical laboratory tests,
durable medical equipment, most supplies, and some other services
not covered by Part A.
Medicare Part A is primarily financed through a mandatory 2.9
percent payroll tax.  Part B is financed in part by participant
premium payments of $45.50 per month regardless of benefits
received.  In addition, there are specific cost-sharing
arrangements. In particular, under Part A in each benefit period a
recipient of benefits pays: $776 for a hospital stay of 1-60 days;
an additional  $194 per day for days 61-90; an additional $338 per
day for days 91-150; and all costs for each day beyond 150 days.
We assume that at age 65 both husband and wife enroll in both Part
A and Part B. It is typical for individual to enroll in both plans
(in 1998, 95% of all the enrollees were enrolled in both Plan A
and Plan B at the same time). We assumed that in each year an
individual, if s/he receives benefits, stays in the hospital less
than 60 days and so pays the fixed fee of $776. Under Part B,
participants receiving benefits must first meet an annual $10050
deductible  and, in most cases, cover 20 percent of the approved
amount after the deductible.
In our calculations, we impute to each age-eligible spouse at a
particular age their expected Medicare benefits at that age.  If a
participant is exempt from cost sharing and/or premium payments,
we  considered  that Medicaid covers those costs, as described in
the section below on Medicare-Medicaid interactions. Any  actual
out-of-pocket  cost sharing and premium payments were
correspondingly  deducted  from the gross income in calculations of
the Food Stamps benefits for eligible individuals.
Our  calculation of average expected Medicare benefits at a given
age  multiplies  the age- and sex-specific probability that
participants  receive benefits by the average benefit received at
that age by benefit recipients (we applied same probability for
the Part A and Part B). According to 1996-1997 data, 76.9 percent
of  elderly male participants and 84.7 percent of elderly female
participants received Medicare benefits.
Our data on Medicare benefits for
aged in 1997 come from the Health
Care  Financial  Administration
(HCFA). HCFA provides average
Medicare benefits under Part A and
under Part B classified by age and
sex. We also found that, in the
aggregate, average benefits per
person enrolled were 26 percent
and 5 percent greater,
respectively,  under Plan A and
Plan B, in Massachusetts compared
to  the national averages, so we
incorporated  that  adjustment for
all age cohorts and both sexes. We
converted all 1997 amounts to 2001
dollars using CPI.
Sources
1. Medicare. Health Care Financial Administration. Internet:
  http://www.hcfa.gov/medicare/medicare.htm
2. The 2000 Green Book: MEDICARE.  Internet:
http://aspe.hhs.gov/2000gb/sec2.txt
Medicaid
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that provides medical
care to the poor.  In 1996 Medicaid recipients constituted 14
percent of the US population.  Among those aged 0 to 5 and 85 and
older, the coverage rate reached 35 percent.   The 1998 Current
Population Survey explored health insurance coverage of low-
income,  single-family  married households with two  children.  The
survey indicates that over 50 percent of all Medicaid income-
Age Men Women Men Women
65 & over3062 3024 1674 1565
65, 66 1748 1526 1178 1173
67, 68 1982 1709 1312 1250
69, 70 2301 1987 1451 1376
71, 72 2548 2220 1581 1471
73, 74 2867 2578 1699 1546
65-69 1930 1676 1279 1239
70-74 2638 2328 1607 1488
75-79 3493 3144 1887 1668
80-84 4534 4132 2107 1806
85 & over5562 5253 2139 1847
Part A Part B
Reimbursement  per Person Enro
1997 Preliminary Annual Su51
eligible infants, children, and adults had no access to any other
form of private or public health insurance.  However, not all
eligible individuals apply for Medicaid.  Of Medicaid eligibles
with no any other type of insurance, only 60 percent of infants,
40 percent of children, and 20 percent of adults were enrolled in
Medicaid in 1998
9.  For purposes of this study, however, we assume
that our households, when eligible, do apply and receive all
Medicaid benefits to which they are entitled.
Medicaid covers most, but not all, medically necessary medical
care and services provided to eligible individuals.  Each  state
establishes  its  eligibility standards and general rules. The
policies are complex and vary considerably  from state to state. 
In Massachusetts,  Medicaid is officially known as MassHealth.  In
addition to serving the poor in general, MassHealth incorporates
special programs to assist poor pregnant women and children, the
disabled, and immigrants who are in need of emergency care.
MassHealth provides the following services:
-  Inpatient hospital services
-  Outpatient services: hospitals, clinics, doctors, dentists
(limited dental coverage for adults), family planning, and home-
health care
-  Medical services: lab tests, X rays, therapies, pharmacy
services, dental services, eyeglasses, hearing aids, medical
equipment and supplies, adult day health, and adult foster care
-  Mental health and substance abuse services: inpatient and
outpatient
-  Living in nursing homes
-  Payment of the Medicare premium, coinsurance,  and  deductibles
for certain groups of elderly
 
  Like  Medicare, Medicaid operates as a vendor payment program;
recipients receive benefits directly in the form of medical
services provided by qualified vendors.  Benefits are provided as
long as the individual meets general and financial eligibility
criteria. Financial eligibility criteria include income
eligibility requirements, which may be different for different
family members, and assets eligibility requirements.  MassHealth
Standard Program specifies that the family monthly income before
taxes and deductions cannot exceed:
 
-  200 percent of the FPL (Federal Poverty Level) for pregnant
women and infants
-  150 percent of the FPL for children under age 19
-  133 percent of the FPL for parents with children under age 19
Under  MassHealth  the income limit for an eligible individual
(couple) aged 65 and over is 100 percent of FPL.  In addition, in
Massachusetts if an individual is eligible for SSI, s/he would
                        
9 Besides providing full exclusive coverage for the eligibles, in many cases
Medicaid may supplement and/or subsidize coverage provided by other parties
(e.g., employers). In fact, Medicaid benefits that we impute in our study to
the eligible households represent average amounts over the whole array of
types of health care financing provided by Medicaid.52
also be eligible for Medicaid.  The table below presents the
respective income limits.
family size 100% 133% 150% 200%
1 696 926 1,044 1,392
2 938 1,248 1,407 1,876
3 1,180 1,569 1,770 2,360
4 1,421 1,890 2,132 2,842
Federal Poverty Levels
Medicaid eligibility may be extended to individuals with incomes
greater than the above income limits if they are deemed “medically
needy.” States provide residual financing of such individuals’
medical treatment costs, provided they spend their excess
resources (income and assets) down to the eligibility limits. 
This is particularly the case for individuals moving into nursing
homes with insufficient resources to fully finance their stays.  
For simplicity, we do not consider cases of the medically needy in
this analysis.
In each year we determine for each family member of a particular
age and sex if s/he meets appropriate income standards of
eligibility and then allocate to that individual the Medicaid age-
and  sex-specific  benefit projected to prevail in that year. 
Fortunately, statistics on Medicaid eligibles, recipients, and
total vendor payments are available by sex and age.  When the
beneficiary in our stylized case is a child under 19, we ignore
gender difference in benefits. Our estimates of the average
benefits for the most recent data, for 1998, are presented in the
table below
10.
We  make an adjustment to these benefit amounts for Medicaid
payment of Part B Medicare premium for certain low-income
individuals.
If a person over age 65 is eligible for Medicaid, his/her Medicare
cost-sharing  will be partially or fully financed by Medicaid. 
There are two broad groups of dual-eligibles:  those  for  whom
Medicaid pays only Medicare part B premiums (so-called, SLMB
eligibles),  and those who get extensive coverage from Medicaid
(see the discussion on Medicaid-Medicare  interactions  below). Our
calculated average benefit values for aged eligibles reflect
Medicaid payments made for both these groups.  However, we impute
full Medicaid benefits only to the elderly with incomes less than
100 percent of the federal poverty line; and we treat SLMB
eligibles separately.  Specifically, for those over 65, who are
eligible for the full coverage, we adjusted the average Medicaid
benefits by excluding payments for SLMB eligibles, using data on
the fraction (4.6 percent) of those receiving benefits from both
                        
10 To adjust for the fact that for some age groups the data in Massachusetts
show a greater number of recipients than eligibles, in calculating average
benefits we divided total expenditures by the maximum of a) the number of
eligibles and b) the number of recipients.53
Medicare and Medicaid who are SLMB recipients, the size of the
SLMB Medicaid benefit (equal to the annual Part B premium), and
the overall average Medicaid benefit. Our final calculated
adjusted age- and sex-specific Medicaid benefits in Massachusetts
for 1988 are presented in the table below. 
Finally we estimated benefits per eligible in Massachusetts by
applying 1997 Massachusetts age-specific probabilities of being
eligible and getting benefits.  We used the CPI to measure 1998
benefit levels in 2001 dollars.
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Under 1 18,610 17,71164,35358,028 3,458 3,276 3,458 3,276 82% 2,838 2,689
1   -  5 65,209 61,518 107,69290,325 1,651 1,468 1,651 1,468 88% 1,459 1,297
6   -  14 91,847 86,622 163,627 125,250 1,782 1,446 1,782 1,446 90% 1,596 1,296
15 - 20 33,759 45,24777,841 114,959 2,306 2,541 2,306 2,541 89% 2,048 2,257
21 - 44 73,722 171,693 544,444 675,932 7,385 3,937 7,385 3,937 86% 6,338 3,379
45 - 64 43,183 60,868 424,169 484,932 9,823 7,967 9,823 7,967 88% 8,650 7,016
65 - 74 14,281 28,541 140,319 220,882 9,826 7,739 10,273 8,086 94% 9,633 7,582
75 - 84 11,590 32,914 146,416 418,17712,63312,70513,21613,291 100% 13,216 13,29
85 & Over 8,86742,056 106,515 645,50112,01315,34912,56516,062 100% 12,565 16,06
Age
1998 Medicaid Benefits in Massachusetts
Recipients, Expenditure, Average Benefits, and Estimated Benefits per Eli





Avg Net Benefit 
Eligible
Recipients Expenditure, $  ths Avg Benefit per
Recipient
In each year we determine for each family member of a particular
age and sex if s/he meets appropriate income standards for
eligibility and then allocate to that individual the Medicaid age-
and sex-specific  benefit projected to prevail in that year.  When
the  beneficiary in our stylized case is a child under 19, we
ignore gender difference in benefits.
Sources
1. HCFA-2082 Report for Federal Fiscal Year 1998. Internet:
  http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/msis/2082%2D98.htm




3. MassHealth Member Booklet. Internet:
  www.state.ma.us/dma/masshealthinfo/memberbklt.pdf
4. Medicaid. Health Care Financial Administration. Internet:
  http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/medicaid.htm
Adjustment for Nursing Home Benefits
A  large fraction of elderly Medicaid recipients receive benefits
in  form of Medicaid-paid nursing home services. Considering
contingency of receiving such benefits as part of the Medicaid
coverage, we correspondingly adjusted benefits from the SSI and
the Food Stamp programs. When a Medicaid beneficiary lives in such
facility,  s/he receives no food stamps and her/his SSI benefits54
are limited  by the maximum monthly amount of only $65.
Using the survey data on the elderly population in poverty and the
data on the nursing home residents who entered the facilities  with
Medicaid as a primary funding source, we determined the
probability  that a person of a particular age who earns less than
the poverty measure (which defines eligibility for Medicaid for
the elderly) will reside in a nursing home. Our probabilities are
6%, 16%, and 49% correspondingly  for the cohorts of 65-74, 75-84,
and 85 years of age or older. We make no adjustment for those
under 65.
In our calculations we use an 8-month average duration for 
Medicaid-financed  nursing  home stays. Let Ph  stand for the
probability  for the husband in a particular year to be Medicaid
eligible and live in a nursing home, and let Pw  be  such
probability for wife:
1.  Ph _ Pw is the probability  that both spouses live in a nursing
home for 8 months and collect benefits from the SSI and Food
Stamps for only 4 months that year;
2.  Ph _ (1- Pw)  is  the  probability  that the husband spends 8
months in a nursing home and his family receives only partial
benefits from the other programs (that depends on her own income
at  home) during these 8 months and full benefits during the
other 4 months;
3.  Pw _ (1- Ph)  is  the  probability  that the wife spends 8 months
in a nursing home and her husband receives only partial benefits
from the other programs during these 8 months and full benefits
during the other 4 months;
4.  (1- Ph) _ (1- Pw)  is  the  probability  that neither of the
spouses lives in nursing home in a particular  year and the
family receives full amount of benefits from the other programs
during the year.
Expected benefits from the SSI and the Food Stamp programs were
correspondingly  calculated  using  combinations of these
probabilities,  average duration of stay in nursing home, and the
values of original benefits in each situation. During periods when
one spouse lives home and the other one is in a nursing home, we
calculate  SSI and Food Stamp original benefit based on the income
of the spouse who stays home. We also incorporated a similar
adjustment in the cases when one of the spouses is either deceased
of ineligible for Medicaid-financed nursing home stay.
We ignored waiting periods for eligibility to the various welfare
programs.
1.  SourcesThe National Nursing Home Survey: 1997 Summary.
National Center for Health Statistics. Internet:
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_13/sr13_147.pdf
2.  The 2000 Green Book. Appendix A. Data On The Elderly.
Table A-7: Poverty Rates of the Elderly By Age, Sex, and
Marital Status, 1998.  Internet:
http://aspe.hhs.gov/2000gb/appena.txt55
Medicaid's Confiscation of the Income of Nursing Home Residents
Medicaid confiscates the incomes of Medicaid recipients residing
in nursing homes in excess of $60 per month. Hence, net Medicaid
benefits are income-sensitive. To adjust for this income tax we
used the above-defined probability that a Medicaid eligible would
reside in a nursing home. We also assumed that the average income
of an individual staying in nursing home on a Medicaid subsidy is
50  percent of the Medicaid income-eligibility  threshold  (about
$350 per month). Noting that the reported Medicaid benefits are
based on the average income of the nursing home residents, we then
adjusted the Medicaid benefit by reducing (increasing) it by the
amount of the difference between the individual’s income and the
assumed average income of the nursing home residents financed by
Medicaid.
Medicaid-Medicare Interactions
Medicare  beneficiaries  with  low incomes and limited resources may
receive help to pay Medicare premiums and other cost-sharing
payments from their state Medicaid programs. The extent of
assistance  that Medicaid offers varies based on the Medicare
beneficiary  characteristics.  Medicare  beneficiaries  who are
eligible for Medicaid assistance fall into two categories: those
who are sufficiently  poor  and qualify for full Medicaid benefits,
and those who receive partial assistance from Medicaid.  In the
second group, the two most important categories are Qualified
Medicare  Beneficiaries (QMB)  and  Specified  Low-Income
Beneficiaries (SLMB).  To  qualify one has to meet assets
restrictions  and have limited income, as specified in the table. 
For QMBs, income must be below 100 percent of the Federal Poverty
Level (FPL), while for SLMBs it can be below 120 percent of the
FPL.  The state pays Medicare premiums as well as deductibles and
coinsurance  for QMBs.  The basic difference between the fully
covered and the QMBs is that states may impose limits on payments
to QMBs.  For SLMBs, Medicaid pays only Part B monthly premiums. 
The asset test limits for QMB and SLMB programs are $4,000 and
$6,000 for an individual and a couple, respectively.
For persons enrolled in both Medicare and Medicaid, the latter is
always “payer of last resort”, which means that any Medicare-
covered services are paid for by Medicare before any payments are
made by the Medicaid program.  In 1995 there were 6 million dual-
eligible  beneficiaries  nation wide.  They constituted 16 percent
of  the Medicare enrollees and 17 percent of the Medicaid
population. In 1996, 4.6 percent of the dual-eligibles  were  SLMBs,
45  percent were QMBs, and 50.4 percent received full Medicaid
coverage.
The presence of dual eligibles means that the reported Medicaid
payments for individuals over 65 will include Medicare cost-
sharing payments as well as other Medicaid-provided  services. 
Assuming also that any out-of-pocket  Medicare co-payments are
deducted from the gross income included in calculation of value of
Food Stamp benefits, we had to develop a measure of combined net
payments from Medicare, Medicaid, and Food Stamps.56
Those who are not qualify for QMB or SLMB status pay Medicare co-
payments and premiums in the full amounts, and their out-of-pocket
health  expenditures  are included as medical-related  deductions in
our model's Food Stamp benefit calculations.  The  households
involved here have annual incomes ranging between around $14,200
and $18,600, - when they no longer qualify for Medicare co-payment
subsidies,  but are still eligible for Food Stamps  (given higher
Food Stamps gross income standards for the seniors). Generally,
these  households receive no Medicaid benefits, fully cost share
with Medicare, but receive somewhat higher Food Stamps benefits as
a result of these additional medical cost deductions.
For those who are SLMBs (couples with annual incomes between
roughly $11,900 and $14,200), Medicaid covers only Medicare Part B
premiums, which we include as a transfer payment.  We do not
impute to them any other Medicaid benefits; SLMBs still cost-share
with  Medicare,  and their out-of-pocket  Medicare  cost-sharing
payments, which do not involve the Part-B premiums paid on their
behalf, are deductible in the Food Stamps income calculation.
Finally, poor elderly couples (those with annual incomes that are
less than roughly $11,900) pay no Medicare costs whatsoever and
have no Medicare related deductions when it comes to determining
income by the Food Stamps program. We did not distinguish between
fully covered and QMB beneficiaries:  when income of our  household
falls below 100% of the FPL, we simply impute calculated average
Medicaid benefits from the table and do not deduct Medicare
related premium, deductibles, and  coinsurance  from their gross
income. When, based on the asset test, individuals temporarily
loose their eligibility for the full Medicaid coverage or receive
reduced benefits, we assumed that that they remain eligible for
the Medicaid subsidy of Medicare co-payments under the QMB
program, provided they meet requirements of the asset test of the
QMB program.
Sources
1.  “A  Profile Of QMB-Eligible And  SLMB-Eligible  Medicare
Beneficiaries.”  Barents Group LLC: Prepared for Health Care
Financial Administration. April 7,1999.




A  number of Federal programs address the housing needs of lower
income  households.  There are different types of housing aid
available.  The three broad categories are: subsidized  rental
housing,  public  housing, and homeownership  opportunities  for low
income, first-time homebuyers.
Rental assistance programs generally reduce tenants’ rent payments
by  a  fixed  percentage -- usually 30 percent or higher, depending
on  the  treatment of heating costs -- of their adjusted income,
                        
11 This section and the next section draw heavily on the housing program
descriptions cited as data sources.57
with the government paying the remaining portion of the rent. In
Massachusetts,  there  are three types of rental assistance
programs:  The “Section 8” program, the Massachusetts  Rental
Voucher Program (MRVP), and the Alternative Housing Voucher
Program (AHVP). The federal government funds “Section 8”
assistance, and the state funds the MRVP and AHVP programs.  While
the  income-eligibility  limit for the “Section 8” program is 80
percent of the area median income ($50,200 for a family of 4 in
Boston), a participant of the state rental voucher program or the
alternative program can earn no more than 200 percent of the
federal poverty level ($34,100 for a household of 4, as of April
2000).  Income limits depend on the size of the household.
Public housing apartments are built and subsidized by either the
state or federal government.  The rent a public housing tenant
pays is based on household income and whether the costs of any
utilities  are  included: 30 percent of net income for rent if the
rent includes any basic utilities and 25 percent of net income if
no  utilities  are  provided.  To be eligible to live in public
housing a household must typically earn no more than 80 percent of
the area median income.  Income limits also vary depending on the
number of persons in the household and the region.
There are a variety of programs available to help low- or
moderate- income people purchase a home. Most programs are limited
to  first-time homebuyers. The Federal Government assistance comes
with the long-term commitments to reduce mortgage interest, when
interest subsidies are provided for mortgages financed by private
lenders. Those programs generally limit combined mortgage
payments, property taxes, and insurance costs to a fixed
percentage of income. The current percentage is 28. As an example,
the Soft Second Mortgage Program is a state-funded  program  that
helps  households purchase their first homes. The program requires
a  minimum 5 percent down payment.  The state will subsidize a
second mortgage on behalf of a homeowner who also has a
conventional mortgage.  In 1997, 11 percent of all the assisted
units were newly purchased first homes; the rest were rental
units.
Housing assistance is not provided to all households that qualify
for aid. Each year a limited amount of Federal funds is allocated
to  fund new and existing housing assistance commitments.  As a
result, in most cases new applicants are put on very long (1 to 2
year) waiting list.
Several studies of housing and welfare reform document that in
1996 approximately one quarter of the families receiving AFDC/TANF
benefits lived in assisted housing. However, this ratio varied
significantly  from state to state. Barbara Sard and  Jennifer
Daskal (1998) analyzing data for Massachusetts  show that estimates
of  the  percentage of AFDC households that also received housing
assistance in 1996 ranged between 32 percent and 43 percent. 
Daskal (1998) presents estimates of the percentage of the poor
receiving housing assistance classified by various
characteristics.   At the  aggregate level, she shows that 40
percent of the families with incomes less than 50 percent of the58
FPL received some form of rent subsidies.  For incomes between 50
percent and 99 percent of the FPL, between 100 percent and 149
percent of the FPL, and between 149 percent and 200 percent of the
FPL,  respective recipient rates were 33 percent, 21 percent, and
12  percent. These rates are used in our analysis as income-
specific  probabilities of a household's receiving some form of
subsidy.
In our stylized cases, our households rent living accommodations,
and if they are income-eligible, we assume that they apply to the
rent  assistance program. The just-described  income-specific
recipient rates refer to population of AFDC recipients; we extend
these rates to the whole population of the households  with
qualifying levels of income.  In so doing, we disregard factors of
age and the presence of child in a family that may make actual
probabilities differ from those used in the study.
Following  the  regulations, we assume that rent in excess of 30
percent of family income is subsidized by the authorities. We
simply treat this difference (multiplied by the probability of
receiving  the benefit) as an additional government transfer
payment.
Housing subsidies become part of the gross monthly income that we
use in determining eligibility for the Food Stamps program.
Sources
1.  G.  Thomas Kingsley. Federal Housing Assistance  and  Welfare
Reform: Uncharted Territory. Number A-19 in Series, "New
Federalism: Issues and Options for States". 1997. Internet:
http://newfederalism.urban.org/html/anf19.html
1.  Barbara Sard. The Importance of Issues at the Intersection of
Housing and Welfare Reform for Legal Services Work. Internet:
http://www.clasp.org/pubs/Other/Updated2000Jan-
FebIntersectionHousingWelfare1.htm:
1.  Barbara Sard and Jennifer Daskal. Housing and Welfare Reform:
Some Background Information. November 5, 1998. Internet:
 http://www.cbpp.org/hous212.htm
1.  Jennifer Daskal. In Search of Shelter: The Growing Shortage
of  Affordable Rental Housing. Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities. 1998. Internet:
http://www.cbpp.org/615hous.pdf
1.  The 1998 Green Book. Program Descriptions.  Federal  Housing
Assistance.  (AND)  Transitional Assistance to Families with
Dependent Children. Internet:
http://aspe.hhs.gov/98gb/15other.htm
Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP)
LIHEAP is a block-grant program of the Federal Government that
allocates funds between states to operate various home energy
assistance programs for needy households. The funds may be used
for the purposes of home heating and cooling assistance, energy-
crisis  intervention,  and low-cost weatherization or other energy-
related home repairs.
LIHEAP assists eligible low-income households in meeting the59
heating or cooling portion of their residential energy needs. Low-
income households are defined as households with incomes that
cannot exceed the greater of 150 percent of the poverty level or
60  percent of state median income ($28,135, $34,755, and $41,375
for 2-, 3-, and 4- person families respectively in Massachusetts
in  2001). The states have flexibility of setting their income
eligibility at or below this maximum standard. LIHEAP payments can
be  made to households where one or more persons are receiving
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC/TANF), or food stamps. Priority may be granted to
those  households  with the greatest energy cost in relation to
income, taking into consideration the presence of children and
elderly.
In  Massachusetts in 1995, 140 thousand households received an
average of $348 from the single largest program component --
heating assistance. However, only one fifth of LIHEAP-eligible
households received heating and/or winter crisis assistance in
that year.
We  treat LIHEAP benefits in our analysis in the same way as
housing assistance benefits. With a probability of 20 percent (the
national estimate) we add the CPI-inflated  value of the  annual
benefit to the income of eligible households. 
Sources
1.  Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program. Block Grant
Overview.  Internet:  http://www.save-
liheap.org/overview/contents.htm
2.  Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP).  US
Department of Health and Human Services. Internet:
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/liheap/liheap.htm
1.  The 1998 Green Book. Program Descriptions. Low-Income Home
Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP).  Internet:
http://aspe.hhs.gov/98gb/15other.htm
2.  The  Low-Income  Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP).
Report for Congress.






































1 21.4 625.3 530.6 -17.8
1.5 32.1 590.5 795.9 25.8
2 42.8 707.2 1061.2 33.4
3 64.3 952.6 1591.8 40.2
4 85.7 1185.9 2122.7 44.1
5 107.1 1401.2 2654.1 47.2
6 128.5 1587.1 3185.5 50.2
7 150.0 1787.0 3717.0 51.9
8 171.4 1991.3 4233.2 53.0
9 192.8 2210.2 4707.7 53.1
10 214.2 2432.2 5182.2 53.1
15 321.4 3485.1 7554.8 53.9
20 428.5 4562.3 9927.4 54.0
30 642.7 6704.8 14672.7 54.3
40 857.0 8845.2 19417.9 54.4
  All  amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars. Present
values are actuarial and assume a
  5  percent real discount  rate.  The net tax rate is
calculated as 100 times the quantity 1
  minus the ratio of a to b, where a is column 3  and b is
column 4.
  Source: Authors’ calculations.61
Table 2
Present Values of Taxes and Transfers of Full-Time Workers







































1 21.4 134.8 10.5 -14.0 27.5 0.9 23.2 1.6 2.1 6.9 2.2 26.0 172.6
1.5 32.1 202.2 23.1 32.0 35.1 1.2 28.5 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.0 26.0 21.5
2 42.8 269.7 36.6 66.8 43.6 1.7 33.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 26.0 11.8
3 64.3 404.5 63.5 152.5 59.2 2.9 44.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 26.0 0.0
4 85.7 539.3 90.3 268.4 72.1 3.9 54.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 26.0 0.0
5 107.1 674.2 117.1 395.4 85.1 4.6 59.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 26.0 0.0
6 128.5 809.0 144.2 551.8 95.7 5.4 64.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.0 0.0
7 150.0 943.8 171.0 694.6 107.7 6.1 69.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.0 0.0
8 171.4 1,049
.4
































605.1 83.2 73.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.0 0.0
Present values are actuarial assuming a 5 percent real discount rate.
Source: Authors’ calculations62
Table 3







































1 21.4 25.4 2.0 -2.6 5.2 0.2 4.4 0.3 0.4 1.3 0.4 4.9 32.5
1.5 32.1 25.4 2.9 4.0 4.4 0.2 3.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 3.3 2.7
2 42.8 25.4 3.4 6.3 4.1 0.2 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 1.1
3 64.3 25.4 4.0 9.6 3.7 0.2 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0
4 85.7 25.4 4.3 12.6 3.4 0.2 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0
5 107.1 25.4 4.4 14.9 3.2 0.2 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
6 128.5 25.4 4.5 17.3 3.0 0.2 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0
7 150.0 25.4 4.6 18.7 2.9 0.2 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0
8 171.4 24.8 4.7 19.9 2.8 0.2 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0
9 192.8 22.8 4.8 21.4 2.8 0.2 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0
10 214.2 21.2 4.9 22.5 2.9 0.2 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0
15 321.4 16.3 5.2 26.7 3.0 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
20 428.5 13.7 5.4 28.6 3.0 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
30 642.7 11.0 5.6 30.5 3.1 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0
40 857.0 9.6 5.7 31.5 3.1 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
All amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars. Present values are actuarial assuming a 5
percent real discount rate.
Source: Authors’ calculations63
Table 4













































1 21.4 411.3 530.6 625.3 33.6
1.5 32.1 411.3 795.9 590.5 51.1
2 42.8 411.3 1061.2 707.2 52.0
3 64.3 411.3 1591.8 952.6 52.4
4 85.7 411.3 2122.7 1185.9 53.2
5 107.1 411.3 2654.1 1401.2 54.3
6 128.5 411.3 3185.5 1587.1 55.9
7 150.0 411.3 3717.0 1787.0 56.7
8 171.4 411.3 4233.2 1991.3 57.1
9 192.8 411.3 4707.7 2210.2 56.8
10 214.2 411.3 5182.2 2432.2 56.5
15 321.4 411.3 7554.8 3485.1 56.3
20 428.5 411.3 9927.4 4562.3 55.9
30 642.7 411.3 14672.7 6704.8 55.6
40 857.0 411.3 19417.9 8845.2 55.4
All amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars. Present values are
actuarial  and assume a 5 percent real discount rate.  The net
tax rate is calculated as 100 times the quantity: 1 minus the
































1 10.7 587.4 265.8 -121.0
1.5 16.1 623.6 398.7 -56.4
2 21.4 625.3 530.6 -17.8
3 32.1 590.5 795.9 25.8
4 42.8 707.2 1061.2 33.4
5 53.6 825.5 1326.5 37.8
6 64.3 952.6 1591.8 40.2
7 75.0 1070.3 1857.1 42.4
8 85.7 1185.9 2122.7 44.1
9 96.4 1295.9 2388.4 45.7
10 107.1 1401.2 2654.1 47.2
15 160.7 1885.4 3982.7 52.7
20 214.2 2432.2 5182.2 53.1
30 321.4 3485.1 7554.8 53.9
40 428.5 4562.3 9927.4 54.0
All amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars. Present
values are actuarial assuming a
5 percent real discount rate.  The net tax rate is
calculated as 100 times the quantity 1 minus
the ratio of a to b, where a is column 3 and b is column 4.
Source: Authors’ calculations.65
Table 6
Present Values of Taxes and Transfers of Half-Time Workers



































1 10.7 67.4 0.4 -49.2 19.4 0.1 14.8 52.1 8.1 39.5 2.5 26.0 233.9
1.5 16.1 101.1 4.7 -35.8 25.1 0.2 20.6 20.2 3.6 21.5 2.1 26.0 218.4
2 21.4 134.8 10.5 -14.0 27.5 0.9 23.2 1.6 2.1 6.9 2.2 26.0 172.6
3 32.1 202.2 23.1 32.0 35.1 1.2 28.5 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.0 26.0 21.5
4 42.8 269.7 36.6 66.8 43.6 1.7 33.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 26.0 11.8
5 53.6 337.1 50.0 105.9 51.8 2.2 38.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 26.0 0.0
6 64.3 404.5 63.5 152.5 59.2 2.9 44.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 26.0 0.0
7 75.0 471.9 76.9 209.4 65.7 3.4 49.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 26.0 0.0
8 85.7 539.3 90.3 268.4 72.1 3.9 54.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 26.0 0.0
9 96.4 606.7 103.7 329.4 78.6 4.3 57.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 26.0 0.0
10 107.1 674.2 117.1 395.4 85.1 4.6 59.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 26.0 0.0
15 160.7 1011.
2
184.6 766.8 113.6 6.6 72.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.0 0.0
20 214.2 1100.
5
254.1 1164.3 149.4 11.2 73.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.0 0.0
30 321.4 1228.
3
393.3 2020.5 224.0 20.7 73.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.0 0.0
40 428.5 1356.
0
534.2 2837.0 300.5 32.7 73.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.0 0.0
Present values are actuarial assuming a 5 percent real discount rate.
Source: Authors’ calculations66
Table 7




































1 10.7 25.4 0.1 -18.5 7.3 0.1 5.6 19.6 3.1 14.8 0.9 9.8 88.0
1.5 16.1 25.4 1.2 -9.0 6.3 0.1 5.2 5.1 0.9 5.4 0.5 6.5 54.8
2 21.4 25.4 2.0 -2.6 5.2 0.2 4.4 0.3 0.4 1.3 0.4 4.9 32.5
3 32.1 25.4 2.9 4.0 4.4 0.2 3.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 3.3 2.7
4 42.8 25.4 3.4 6.3 4.1 0.2 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 1.1
5 53.6 25.4 3.8 8.0 3.9 0.2 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0
6 64.3 25.4 4.0 9.6 3.7 0.2 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0
7 75.0 25.4 4.1 11.3 3.5 0.2 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0
8 85.7 25.4 4.3 12.6 3.4 0.2 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0
9 96.4 25.4 4.3 13.8 3.3 0.2 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0
10 107.1 25.4 4.4 14.9 3.2 0.2 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
15 160.7 25.4 4.6 19.3 2.9 0.2 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0
20 214.2 21.2 4.9 22.5 2.9 0.2 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0
30 321.4 16.3 5.2 26.7 3.0 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
40 428.5 13.7 5.4 28.6 3.0 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
All amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars. Present values are actuarial assuming a 5
percent real discount rate.
Source: Authors’ calculations67
Table 8












































1 10.7 411.3 265.8 587.4 13.2
1.5 16.1 411.3 398.7 623.6 23.0
2 21.4 411.3 530.6 625.3 33.6
3 32.1 411.3 795.9 590.5 51.1
4 42.8 411.3 1061.2 707.2 52.0
5 53.6 411.3 1326.5 825.5 52.5
6 64.3 411.3 1591.8 952.6 52.4
7 75.0 411.3 1857.1 1070.3 52.8
8 85.7 411.3 2122.7 1185.9 53.2
9 96.4 411.3 2388.4 1295.9 53.7
10 107.1 411.3 2654.1 1401.2 54.3
15 160.7 411.3 3982.7 1885.4 57.1
20 214.2 411.3 5182.2 2432.2 56.5
30 321.4 411.3 7554.8 3485.1 56.3
40 428.5 411.3 9927.4 4562.3 55.9
All amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars. Present values are
actuarial assuming a 5 percent real discount rate. The net tax
rate is calculated as 100 times the quantity 1 minus the ratio



















































1 21.4 625.3 587.4 6.4 93.6
1.5 32.1 590.5 623.6 -5.3 105.3
2 42.8 707.2 625.3 13.1 86.9
3 64.3 952.6 590.5 61.3 38.7
4 85.7 1185.9 707.2 67.7 32.3
5 107.1 1401.2 825.5 69.7 30.3
6 128.5 1587.1 952.6 66.6 33.4
7 150.0 1787.0 1070.3 67.0 33.0
8 171.4 1991.3 1185.9 67.9 32.1
9 192.8 2210.2 1295.9 70.6 29.4
10 214.2 2432.2 1401.2 73.6 26.4
15 321.4 3485.1 1885.4 84.9 15.1
20 428.5 4562.3 2432.2 87.6 12.4
30 642.7 6704.8 3485.1 92.4 7.6
40 857.0 8845.2 4562.3 93.9 6.1
All amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars. Present values are
actuarial  and assume a 5 percent real discount rate.   The net
tax rate on switching from part-time to full-time work is
calculated as 100 minus the ratio of a) column 3  minus column 4
to b) column 4 in Table 8.
Source: Authors’ calculations.69
Table 10




































1 21.4 657.5 637.4 646.2 624.0 9.7
1.5 32.1 639.2 626.9 644.3 614.0 59.6
2 42.8 769.6 751.0 779.3 740.0 52.8
3 64.3 1045.5 1013.7 1064.4 1003.3 47.9
4 85.7 1308.0 1264.7 1336.6 1254.7 47.1
5 107.1 1552.0 1497.5 1590.1 1487.9 46.7
6 128.5 1764.9 1700.4 1815.9 1691.1 48.4
7 150.0 1993.7 1919.7 2054.0 1910.7 48.3
8 171.4 2222.3 2137.2 2291.8 2128.6 47.9
9 192.8 2446.8 2351.0 2525.7 2342.8 47.6
10 214.2 2674.5 2568.1 2763.0 2560.5 47.4
15 321.4 3754.6 3598.4 3894.1 3594.3 47.9
20 428.5 4861.1 4643.4 5048.2 4652.6 45.0
30 642.7 7064.5 6738.7 7343.9 6759.2 44.3
40 857.0 9268.5 8837.0 9638.7 8866.4 44.1
All amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars. Present values are
actuarial assuming a 5 percent real discount rate.     The net
tax rate is calculated as 100 times the quantity 1 minus the
ratio of a to b, where a is the difference between   column 3 to
column 4 and b is the difference between columns 5 and 6.
Source: Authors’ calculations.70
Table 11




































1 21.4 657.4 642.8 651.2 634.7 11.5
1.5 32.1 639.1 631.2 644.0 623.7 61.1
2 42.8 769.6 757.2 776.4 750.1 52.9
3 64.3 1045.5 1023.6 1059.5 1017.3 48.2
4 85.7 1307.8 1277.8 1328.4 1272.2 46.7
5 107.1 1551.8 1514.0 1578.1 1508.8 45.5
6 128.5 1764.6 1720.8 1797.5 1715.8 46.2
7 150.0 1993.5 1942.5 2031.2 1938.0 45.2
8 171.4 2222.1 2162.5 2266.7 2158.5 44.9
9 192.8 2446.6 2378.9 2494.7 2375.4 43.2
10 214.2 2674.3 2598.2 2727.2 2595.2 42.3
15 321.4 3754.4 3640.3 3835.1 3639.8 41.6
20 428.5 4860.9 4707.5 4968.6 4709.6 40.8
30 642.7 7064.3 6832.1 7189.0 6839.4 33.6
40 857.0 9268.2 8948.5 9408.7 8969.9 27.1
  All amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars. Present values
are actuarial assuming a 5 percent real         discount  rate.
The net tax rate is calculated as 100 times the quantity 1 minus
the ratio of a to b, where a   is the difference between column
3 to column 4 and b is the difference between columns 5 and 6.
  Source: Authors’ calculations.71
Table 12




































1 21.4 657.4 647.6 659.9 648.0 16.7
1.5 32.1 639.1 627.8 642.0 628.4 16.6
2 42.8 769.6 755.1 771.8 755.9 9.5
3 64.3 1045.5 1023.8 1050.4 1024.9 14.8
4 85.7 1307.8 1280.3 1314.1 1281.7 15.3
5 107.1 1551.8 1520.5 1559.4 1522.2 16.1
6 128.5 1764.6 1732.3 1773.5 1734.2 17.8
7 150.0 1993.5 1956.5 2004.6 1958.5 19.7
8 171.4 2222.1 2182.0 2234.9 2184.3 20.7
9 192.8 2446.6 2402.7 2460.5 2405.4 20.3
10 214.2 2674.3 2626.2 2689.1 2629.2 19.6
15 321.4 3754.4 3693.0 3780.6 3697.7 25.9
20 428.5 4860.9 4799.0 4896.8 4805.4 32.2
30 642.7 7064.3 7005.5 7120.3 7013.9 44.7
40 857.0 9268.2 9187.2 9343.3 9199.2 43.8
All amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars. Present values are
actuarial assuming a 5 percent real discount rate.     The net 
tax rate is calculated as 100 times the quantity 1 minus the
ratio of a to b, where a is the difference between   column 3 to
column 4 and b is the difference between columns 5 and 6.
Source: Authors’ calculations.72
Table 13




































1 21.4 657.4 652.6 658.5 652.9 12.7
1.5 32.1 639.1 632.5 640.7 633.0 14.2
2 42.8 769.6 762.2 771.1 762.9 10.4
3 64.3 1045.5 1036.8 1050.5 1037.8 31.7
4 85.7 1307.8 1298.2 1314.7 1299.3 37.9
5 107.1 1551.8 1540.5 1560.8 1541.8 40.3
6 128.5 1764.6 1752.2 1775.9 1753.8 43.4
7 150.0 1993.5 1978.9 2007.5 1980.9 45.2
8 171.4 2222.1 2205.3 2238.4 2207.6 45.5
9 192.8 2446.6 2428.3 2464.2 2431.1 44.6
10 214.2 2674.3 2654.2 2694.6 2657.6 45.6
15 321.4 3754.4 3719.4 3789.5 3725.6 45.2
20 428.5 4860.9 4812.4 4909.4 4822.2 44.3
30 642.7 7064.3 6991.7 7140.2 7009.1 44.6
40 857.0 9268.2 9168.6 9370.5 9194.8 43.3
All amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars. Present values are
actuarial assuming a 5 percent real discount rate.     The net
tax rate is calculated as 100 times the quantity 1 minus the
ratio of a to b, where a is the difference between   column 3 to
column 4 and b is the difference between columns 5 and 6.
Source: Authors’ calculations.73
Table 14




































1 21.4 657.4 655.1 658.4 655.3 24.5
1.5 32.1 639.1 634.7 640.8 635.2 21.6
2 42.8 769.6 763.8 771.4 764.4 17.7
3 64.3 1045.5 1036.9 1051.2 1038.0 35.2
4 85.7 1307.8 1297.1 1316.6 1298.6 40.7
5 107.1 1551.8 1539.2 1562.6 1541.5 40.5
6 128.5 1764.6 1750.7 1778.7 1753.4 44.9
7 150.0 1993.5 1977.5 2010.8 1980.9 46.5
8 171.4 2222.1 2203.8 2242.2 2207.9 46.7
9 192.8 2446.6 2426.8 2470.2 2431.9 48.3
10 214.2 2674.3 2652.5 2700.8 2658.7 48.2
15 321.4 3754.4 3716.8 3798.4 3729.6 45.3
20 428.5 4860.9 4808.5 4922.1 4828.8 43.8
30 642.7 7064.3 6984.9 7160.5 7020.0 43.6
40 857.0 9268.2 9159.5 9398.2 9210.4 42.1
All amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars. Present values are
actuarial and assume a 5 percent real discount rate. The net tax
rate is calculated as 100 times the quantity 1 minus the ratio
of a to b, where a is the difference between column 3 to column
4 and b is the difference between columns 5 and 6.
Source: Authors’ calculations.74
Table 15







































1 21.4 2895 238 -2267 1350 -434 2 -1 0 1090 33 0 0
1.5 32.1 4342 708 182 1751 -561 3 -1- 1 -263 24 0 -12118
2 42.8 5789 1186 1809 2208 -714 4- 10 -263 0 0 -12120
3 64.3 8684 2178 4578 3154 -1017 5- 10 -263 0 0 -12119
4 85.7 11579 3233 9397 3955 -1273 7 -1 0 -263 0 0 -12119
5 107.1 14474 4289 14300 4748 -1528 4 -1 0 -263 0 0 -12119
6 128.5 17368 5359 20437 5454 -1732 5 -1 0 -263 0 0 -12119
7 150.0 20263 6419 27027 6136 -1972 5 -1 0 -263 0 0 -12119
8 171.4 22466 7476 32481 6916 -2220 -2 -1 0 -263 0 0 -12119
9 192.8 23015 8536 39053 7676 -2459 -2 -1 0 -263 0 0 -12119
10 214.2 23563 9597 45690 8431 -2697 -2 -1 0 -263 0 0 -12119
15 321.4 26307 14917 82497 11962 -3822 -2 -1 0 -263 0 0 -12119
20 428.5 29050 20222 117156 15640 -5001 -2 -1 0 -1 0 0 -2731
30 642.7 34537 30824 184922 23107 -7388 -2 -1 0 -1 0 0 -2
40 857.0 40024 41424 252246 30605 -9784 -2 -1 0 -1 0 0 -2
All amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars. Present values are actuarial and assume a 5
percent real discount rate.
Source: Authors’ calculationsTable 16







































1 21.4 1913 191 -1456 1262 -592 1 -
2221
0 2142 0 0 0
1.5 32.1 2870 491 245 1621 -745 0 -6 0 -2 0 0 -8522
2 42.8 3827 778 1094 2058 -952 -2 -6 0 -3 0 0 -8531
3 64.3 5740 1380 2627 2973 -1399 -4 -6 0 -3 0 0 -8531
4 85.7 7653 2020 5491 3755 -1775 -4 -6 0 -3 0 0 -8531
5 107.1 9567 2702 8318 4512 -2002 -8 -6 0 -3 0 0 -8531
6 128.5 11480 3434 12699 5093 -2045 -8 -6 0 -3 0 0 -8531
7 150.0 13393 4110 16292 5787 -2296 -8 -6 0 -3 0 0 -8531
8 171.4 14884 4718 19108 6618 -2789 -13 -6 0 -3 0 0 -8531
9 192.8 15246 5300 23143 7409 -3381 -13 -6 0 -3 0 0 -8531
10 214.2 15609 5907 26643 8228 -3883 -13 -6 0 -3 0 0 -8531
15 321.4 17422 9146 47364 11902 -5634 -13 -6 0 -3 0 0 -8531
20 428.5 19236 12379 66514 15717 -7409 -13 -6 0 -3 0 0 -8531
30 642.7 22862 18848 104820 23352 -10954 -13 -6 0 -3 0 0 -8531
40 857.0 26489 25311 142855 31023 -14517 -13 -6 0 -3 0 0 -9











































1 21.4 1257 5 -226 853 -903 1 0 0 1090 0 0 0
1.5 32.1 1886 241 611 1088 -862 1 0 0 -3 0 0 0
2 42.8 2515 430 1154 1380 -996 1 0 0 -3 0 0 0
3 64.3 3772 737 1857 2074 -1640 2 0 0 -3 0 0 0
4 85.7 5030 1132 3564 2621 -1984 2 0 0 -3 0 0 0
5 107.1 6287 1674 6279 2974 -1791 1 0 0 -3 0 0 0
6 128.5 7545 2451 10094 3067 -740 1 0 0 -3 0 0 0
7 150.0 8802 2974 11986 3507 -617 2 0 0 -3 0 0 0
8 171.4 9804 3477 15885 3793 -566 0 0 0 -3 0 0 0
9 192.8 10043 4011 19045 4152 -401 0 0 0 -3 0 0 0
10 214.2 10281 4542 21896 4532 -245 0 0 0 -3 0 0 0
15 321.4 11473 7632 40981 5711 2114 0 0 0 -3 0 0 0
20 428.5 12664 11815 65249 5491 8468 0 0 0 -3 0 0 0
30 642.7 15048 20515 115544 4784 22404 0 0 0 -3 0 0 0
40 857.0 17431 27192 154449 6635 28940 0 0 0 -3 0 0 0
All amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars. Present values are actuarial and assume a 5
percent real discount rate.
Source: Authors’ calculations77
Table 18








































1 21.4 804 99 234 450 -269 0 0 0 -8 0 0 0
1.5 32.1 1206 255 642 600 -225 0 0 0 -7 0 0 -3
2 42.8 1608 482 1443 656 71 0 0 0 -7 0 0 0
3 64.3 2411 952 3311 751 648 0 0 0 -7 0 0 0
4 85.7 3215 1411 5962 786 1187 0 0 0 -7 0 0 0
5 107.1 4019 1837 8139 907 1599 0 0 0 -7 0 0 0
6 128.5 4823 2234 10863 997 1909 0 0 0 -7 0 0 0
7 150.0 5626 2617 12789 1155 2170 0 0 0 -7 0 0 0
8 171.4 6282 2989 14824 1309 2387 0 0 0 -7 0 0 0
9 192.8 6434 3371 17689 1421 2637 0 0 0 -7 0 0 0
10 214.2 6586 3749 20286 1556 2877 0 0 0 -7 0 0 0
15 321.4 7348 5264 29861 2817 2703 0 0 0 -7 0 0 0
20 428.5 8110 6910 39913 3913 3010 0 0 0 -7 0 0 0
30 642.7 9633 10471 61007 5877 4605 0 0 0 -7 0 0 0
40 857.0 11157 13832 80399 8127 5473 0 0 0 -7 0 0 0












































1 21.4 478 116 193 206 59 62 0 -17 -25 0 0 -288
1.5 32.1 717 152 337 350 -124 93 0 -19 -19 -5 0 -13
2 42.8 956 204 687 464 -262 124 0 -10 -16 0 0 -12
3 64.3 1433 328 1281 694 -487 186 0 0 -17 -1 0 0
4 85.7 1911 511 2306 840 -502 249 0 0 -21 0 0 0
5 107.1 2389 708 3251 974 -464 146 0 0 -17 0 0 0
6 128.5 2867 901 4539 1100 -434 175 0 0 -17 0 0 0
7 150.0 3344 1062 5605 1264 -527 204 0 0 -17 0 0 0
8 171.4 3742 1220 6510 1443 -630 231 0 0 -17 0 0 0
9 192.8 3833 1388 8089 1575 -697 231 0 0 -17 0 0 0
10 214.2 3924 1559 9215 1742 -750 231 0 0 -17 0 0 0
15 321.4 4376 1999 12074 3135 -2546 231 0 0 -17 0 0 0
20 428.5 4829 2536 15271 4370 -3984 231 0 0 -17 0 0 0
30 642.7 5735 3850 22733 6661 -5984 231 0 0 -17 0 0 0
40 857.0 6640 4975 29086 9164 -8675 231 0 0 -17 0 0 0
All amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars. Present values are actuarial assuming a 5 percent
real discount rate.
Source: Authors’calculationsTable 20





























1 21.4 -17.8 -31.7 -14.7 -15.0 -25.4
1.5 32.1 25.8 12.7 31.8 31.2 21.3
2 42.8 33.4 25.0 37.3 36.1 29.7
3 64.3 40.2 36.1 42.2 40.5 39.2
4 85.7 44.1 40.9 45.8 44.5 44.7
5 107.1 47.2 44.9 48.4 47.1 48.0
6 128.5 50.2 48.3 51.2 49.6 50.9
7 150.0 51.9 50.5 52.8 51.8 52.8
8 171.4 53.0 51.9 53.6 52.2 54.2
9 192.8 53.1 52.5 53.5 52.4 54.3
10 214.2 53.1 53.0 53.3 52.4 54.4
15 321.4 53.9 54.9 53.7 52.9 55.3
20 428.5 54.0 55.8 53.6 53.7 55.5
30 642.7 54.3 56.7 53.5 54.1 55.8
40 857.0 54.4 57.3 53.5 54.4 56.0
All amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars. Present values are
actuarial assuming a 5 percent real discount rate.
Source: Authors’calculations80
Table 21





























1 21.4 33.6 25.9 36.6 35.6 29.5
1.5 32.1 51.1 42.5 55.7 54.8 48.1
2 42.8 52.0 46.0 55.3 54.1 49.4
3 64.3 52.4 49.3 54.5 52.8 51.7
4 85.7 53.2 50.5 54.9 53.6 53.7
5 107.1 54.3 52.3 55.6 54.3 55.0
6 128.5 55.9 54.3 57.0 55.5 56.5
7 150.0 56.7 55.4 57.7 56.6 57.5
8 171.4 57.1 56.2 57.8 56.5 58.2
9 192.8 56.8 56.3 57.3 56.3 58.0
10 214.2 56.5 56.4 56.9 55.9 57.8
15 321.4 56.3 57.3 56.2 55.4 57.6
20 428.5 55.9 57.6 55.5 55.6 57.3
30 642.7 55.6 57.9 54.8 55.4 57.0
40 857.0 55.4 58.2 54.5 55.4 56.9
All amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars.
Source: Authors’ calculations.Table 22
















































1 21.4 -17.8 -26.7 -17.8 -9.4 -7.0 -17.7
1.5 32.1 25.8 18.9 25.8 32.8 30.4 26.8
2 42.8 33.4 26.8 33.4 40.0 35.7 33.1
3 64.3 40.2 34.0 40.2 46.5 39.2 40.5
4 85.7 44.1 38.1 44.1 50.3 40.1 45.5
5 107.1 47.2 41.4 47.2 53.2 41.1 48.5
6 128.5 50.2 44.6 50.2 55.9 41.8 51.3
7 150.0 51.9 46.5 51.9 57.6 42.3 53.0
8 171.4 53.0 47.7 53.4 58.4 42.2 53.9
9 192.8 53.1 48.5 54.7 58.1 41.1 53.9
10 214.2 53.1 49.0 55.7 57.7 40.2 53.8
15 321.4 53.9 51.4 59.6 57.3 37.7 54.4
20 428.5 54.0 52.4 61.1 56.8 36.4 54.5
30 642.7 54.3 53.5 62.7 56.5 35.0 54.6
40 857.0 54.4 54.1 63.5 56.3 34.4 54.7
                All amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars
                Source: Authors’ calculations.82
Table 23















































1 21.4 33.6 30.0 33.6 37.2 39.7 33.7
1.5 32.1 51.1 47.3 51.1 55.1 54.1 51.7
2 42.8 52.0 47.9 52.0 56.3 53.6 51.8
3 64.3 52.4 48.0 52.4 57.1 51.7 52.7
4 85.7 53.2 48.6 53.2 58.1 49.9 54.4
5 107.1 54.3 49.6 54.3 59.2 49.0 55.4
6 128.5 55.9 51.2 55.9 60.8 48.5 56.9
7 150.0 56.7 52.0 56.7 61.6 48.0 57.7
8 171.4 57.1 52.5 57.5 62.0 47.3 58.0
9 192.8 56.8 52.7 58.3 61.3 45.8 57.6
10 214.2 56.5 52.9 58.9 60.7 44.6 57.2
15 321.4 56.3 54.0 61.6 59.4 40.9 56.8
20 428.5 55.9 54.4 62.6 58.5 38.9 56.3
30 642.7 55.6 54.8 63.6 57.7 36.8 55.8
40 857.0 55.4 55.0 64.2 57.2 35.7 55.6
                All amounts are in thousands of 2002 dollars.
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